ST PAUL AND MODERN THOUGHT

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

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ST. PAUL AND MODERN THOUGHT.

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ST. PAUL AND MODERN THOUGHT:

REMARKS ON SOME OF THE VIEWS ADVANCED IN

PROFESSOR JOWETT'S

COMMENTARY ON ST. PAUL.

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BY

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PREFACE.

THE Title—"St. Paul and Modern Thought"—was not chosen by myself, nor suggested until after the following pages were written. But I have adopted it, because it indicates a contrast or comparison to which I am as anxious as Professor Jowett that inquiring attention should be directed; and because it gives me an excuse for saying one word more about this contrast. One who believes, or thinks he believes, in what St. Paul declared, will want to know what Modern Thought is, before he can distinctly understand or describe his own relation to it. It appears to me that there are two meanings, either of which might without blame be intended by this term, but which are antagonistic to one another. It might be used to signify that floating mass of commonly received generalizations, of which the more orthodox title would be Modern Opinion. Or it might be used to signify the Method of Modern Science, as illustrated by those discoveries of Natural Laws in which our own age has acquired undoubted distinction. Between these two, Modern Opinion and Modern Science, there is as real a war, though it is not so dramatically waged, as there was between Plato and the Sophists. Any one who is in the slightest degree acquainted with the language of our genuine philosophers, must be aware

how they feel themselves thwarted and embarrassed at every turn, how they have been impeded in their own search after truth, by the popular falsities which come to us with such an air of authority.

To Modern Opinion, as it expresses itself upon many of the most important questions in Theology and Philosophy, Mr. Jowett has held up the mirror of his own sensitive observation. He professes to be its deferential exponent. He faithfully echoes various fallacies which cluster round the great Negation, the denial of the actual Divine ground of things. From this Modern Opinion, a disciple in the school of St. Paul will naturally appeal to the Method of those who have in any department torn down its clinging fallacies. The true discoverers have in all cases advanced through a reverent study of facts to a vision of the Law or Idea expressed in the facts, and they have learnt to honour the facts increasingly as they have been able to interpret them by the Divine Idea: and it is but seldom that they have not seen with awe and submission this Idea resting upon an Active Will. This is precisely the Method which is needed in Theology. It is true that a believer and a Churchman does not suppose that we have now to begin a research into elementary facts without any aid. He holds that the true Idea, the Law and Centre of the Universe, has been set before us. But as, on the one hand, it would be the maddest folly for any modern student to pretend that he will begin an investigation into the facts of the Cosmos without encumbering himself with the theory of Gravitation; or that he will begin the study of Bones by repudiating the Archetype of the vertebrate skeleton; or that he must rebel, as an honest man, against the Atomic Theory, and the Law

Polarity :—so, on the other hand, no well-advised Christian will ask for anything short of the most rigorous scientific insight into facts, when he makes his assertion with St. Paul, that all things and all men are grounded upon the Eternal Son of God, and are interpreted by His Death and Rising again.

It will not do to say, 'What does it signify about 'Truth? We can be good and amiable without 'knowing. We can deal with visible things without 'troubling ourselves about the invisible.' We ought to be aware that we *cannot* be good and amiable without knowing, nor proceed one step in life without implying something about the unseen. We want to know, first of all, what real and durable Righteousness there is that we can stand upon. The question of Righteousness is a more pressing one, it seems to me, than that of Love. And I trust that though Mr. Jowett's own mind appears to be able to rest amidst the contradictions which he has partly seen and partly conjured up, the effect of his work upon his readers will be to make them restless and miserable, unless, or until, they are persuaded that there is some Unity in which opposites are harmonized, some invisible reality which is the substance of visible shadows.

REMARKS,

&c.

THE recent Work of Professor Jowett on some of St. Paul's Epistles evidently claims to be more than a mere commentary. The author has felt, and most justly, that it is impossible to deal honestly and intelligently with the writings of St. Paul, without considering the subjects of those writings from a modern point of view. If his primary aim was not so much to criticise St. Paul, as to conduct an original investigation into the facts and problems of theology, in harmony with the needs and conditions of our own minds, he probably thought that no other plan of inquiry could be adopted with a better hope of searching thoroughly into those questions, than if he were to set forth St. Paul's theology as it really was, and then lay side by side with it such conceptions on the same topics as appear natural and necessary to ourselves. Nothing can be better, either with a view to our knowledge of Scripture or to our own actual creed, than to bring faithfully and unflinchingly into mutual contact what the Bible says and what we ourselves actually hold. All Mr. Jowett's readers, whether they are most interested in the meaning of St. Paul or in things to be now believed, have reason to

thank him for having adopted this explicit and courageous method.

In executing his task he has undoubtedly laid himself open to censure and attack in a singularly frank and almost chivalrous spirit. He has rather sought than shunned to wound the susceptibilities of the religious public. His work has had the effect, probably not unforeseen by himself, of exasperating the advocates of the commonly received opinions, and delighting their assailants, not, I think, in a degree disproportionate to the significance of the book, but certainly on very mistaken grounds. It appears to be thought, on both sides, that Evangelical orthodoxy has received a very severe blow. The one confused impression made on both parties is, that Mr. Jowett has expressed opinions entirely inconsistent with his obligations as a member and minister of the Church of England. The Articles are referred to as the Church's standard formulary. 'Mr. Jowett cannot have the audacity to sign the 'Articles again,' says the one party; 'this insult to all 'we hold sacred may be expiated by the ejection of the 'author of it through an appeal to the Articles.' 'This 'is a most hopeful utterance of enlightened views,' says the other party; 'but alas! for the Thirty-nine Articles!' Now Mr. Jowett *has* repeated his signature to the Articles, and may fairly challenge his critics to point out which of the Articles he contradicts in his book. Certain passages might doubtless be produced which appear to contradict one or two sentences in the Articles; but with such fair explanation as all candid persons must mutually claim and concede, the opposition may be made to disappear. No Unitarian has a right to triumph as if Mr. Jowett had betrayed the slightest wavering with

regard to the Divinity of Jesus Christ: for it would be difficult to find any commentator so untrammelled affirming it so simply and absolutely. No Evangelical Christian has a right to denounce Mr. Jowett as if the Articles defined with crushing stringency the doctrine of the infallibility of Scripture: for there is nothing of the kind in the Articles. This formulary is galling to Romanizers; but it need not make Mr. Jowett wince.

It is wholly unjust, therefore, to assume that Mr. Jowett could not write as he has done without being unfaithful, in the ordinary sense, to his calling as a clergyman. Believing, indeed, that he is seriously in error in some of his opinions, and that his general philosophy is unsound, I cannot but hold that he does not teach what a clergyman ought to teach. But this may be said of many whom no one would think of summoning with indignation before the bar of their own subscriptions. And through this vague general imputation, both the good and the evil of Mr. Jowett's book have been missed. If I had seen any notice of the book, which did not, in my judgment, signally and mischievously misrepresent it, I should not have ventured, knowing, I hope, my comparative incompetency to the task, to attempt to point out where Mr. Jowett appears to me to have especially gone wrong. But having found that even the "Quarterly Review," of which something better might have been hoped, has devoted an article, the ignorance of which is unhappily equalled by its pretentious audacity, to no more worthy purpose than that of raising an alarm against an Oxford Professor as an ally of "infidels," and a servile follower both of Hegel and of Auguste Comte, I cannot but hope that I may do a little more to oppose his real errors, without injustice

to himself, than can possibly be accomplished by such blind or malicious insinuations.

I do not undertake to review Mr. Jowett's long and elaborate book, but only to protest against some portions of it,—certain veins of thought running through it. I may be allowed, however, to express once for all my great admiration for many of its qualities. It seems to me the work of a most candid and honourable man, untainted by party spirit. It shows the fruits of great research, yet is never pedantic or heavy, but instinct everywhere with fresh mental activity. One seldom meets with scholarship so free and natural, blemished with so few inaccuracies. And the feeling throughout is not only amiable and refined, but at bottom, I believe, reverent also, in spite of much that may fairly shock reverence in others.

It is not agreeable to have to bring against a work of this character the charge of inconsistency. It is so easy for vulgar flippancy to make out a case of self-contradiction against any large-minded and free-spoken thinker, and so false a value is commonly attached to consistency, that I would willingly have abstained from alluding to it. As it is, I feel compelled, not so much to complain, as, in justice to the author, to allow, that almost all the objectionable assertions which he makes are balanced by some more or less conspicuous admission of an opposite tendency, such as one knows not how to reconcile with what appear to be his opinions. Some examples of this will be produced. Meanwhile I have to say, by way of introduction, that I shall endeavour to state fairly Mr. Jowett's views on several important questions, arranged in what seems a convenient order; and that it will be generally possible to contradict these views in his own words.

I. The topic which is most prominent on the surface of the book is *the relation of St. Paul's modes of thought to those of our own time.*

Probably, if Mr. Jowett were asked to characterize his own work, he would say that he had laboured more than any other Commentator to effect a real passage from our own thoughts to St. Paul's, by pointing out the chasm which separates them, and the manner in which it may be bridged over. We are continually urged not to forget the radical distinction between our own habits of thought and those of St. Paul's age; the distinction being, that ours are definite and precise and logical, while St. Paul's are indefinite, confused, and rhetorical. Mr. Jowett never betrays any irritation at these defects in St. Paul's writings, often as he imputes them to him, being persuaded that he could not help them,—he could not but think as the men of his time thought, to whom indeed he would have been unintelligible if he had spoken otherwise. The following are some of the passages in which Mr. Jowett alludes to the above difference. In the Essay on the Modes of Time and Place in Scripture (vol. ii. p. 100), he asserts "a con-"fusion of times and places" in St. Paul, supporting the assertion by parallel passages and general considerations. He enumerates four "confusions" with regard to Time, and three with regard to Place. "This spiritual notion "of time and place is not possible to ourselves, but only "to an age which has an imperfect conception of past "history, and an indistinct knowledge of the countries "of the world. To the Apostle it was natural. . . . . "These mixed modes of time and place are no longer "mixed to us, but clear and distinct. We live in the "light of history and of nature, and can never mingle

"together what is inward and what is without us. . . . "No 'contemplation of things under the form of eternity' "will take us from the realities of life. We sometimes "repeat the familiar language of Scripture, but always in "a metaphorical sense. If we desire to understand and "not merely to explain it away, we must throw ourselves "back to the age of the Apostle, and receive, in a new "way, the 'kingdom of God as little children;' "—this new way being, as he has explained before, that of childishness.

Speaking of what "we" propose to ourselves in the consideration of certain questions, Mr. Jowett says, "Nothing can be more unlike the mode in which the "Apostle conceives them, which is not logical at all . . . "but partial and fragmentary." (Vol. ii. p. 247.)

The language of the Apostle concerning "the identity "of the believer with Christ" is said to be "due to the "peculiar rhetorical character of the age." (Vol. ii. p. 330.)

In the Essay on Righteousness by Faith, it is said "The whole language of St. Paul" [concerning Justification] "is relative to what has not only passed away, "but has left no trace of itself in the thoughts of men." (Vol. ii. p. 460.)

"A similar inversion" [to that by which virtue is said to be knowledge and vice ignorance] "of our ordinary "modes of thought occurs also in Scripture." (Vol. ii. p. 55.)

These quotations will not adequately convey to the reader Mr. Jowett's anxiety that we should cast off the bondage of precision when we come to the study of St. Paul; but they will sufficiently impress him, I should hope, with a feeling of discouragement and perplexity. Our only hope of arriving at the meaning of the important parts of Scripture, it would seem, is through

a mental effort which none but a highly cultivated philosopher could put forth; and we have reason to doubt our having got at the real meaning, unless we are quite sure it is indistinct and confused.

I venture to deny utterly that St. Paul is more confused and indeterminate in thought and language than "we" are: Mr. Jowett's Commentary has confirmed me in the conviction that he is much less so. Under subsequent heads there will be occasion to vindicate some of St. Paul's views which are specially charged with confusion: the claim put forward in behalf of "our "age" may here be briefly questioned.

Mr. Jowett is indeterminate in his use of "we." It would probably be most fair to take it as generally meaning himself and his readers; that is, the most cultivated and philosophical part of the reading public. He must try the patience of some of his readers at times by the quiet way in which he attributes numerous opinions to them, in which they would not be prepared to go with him; but we cannot be angry with an author who gives us so much credit for refinement, as to believe that "our nerves could not have borne to witness" some of the chief ceremonies of the early Church. Most of us would be willing enough to accept complacently the character of precise thinkers; the only question is, whether some would be willing to share this character with certain of their fellow-readers. Mr. Jowett ought to include German as well as English readers, for he is evidently thinking most frequently of that criticism in which German inquirers are foremost. But what is thought in England of German modes of thought? How, for example, does Mr. Ruskin, who is certainly not an illogical writer, and who rather

pleasantly claims logical infallibility, estimate German thought? * Among Englishmen, again, if we think of those who are most eminent, and of this particular matter,—the habit of sound and clear distinction,—one is almost afraid to ask what Mr. J. S. Mill's opinion of Dr. Whewell would be, and Dr. Whewell's of Mr. Maurice; whether Lord John Russell would understand Mr. Carlyle, and Mr. Carlyle the writers for the "Times;" what Mr. James Martineau would think of Mr. Lewes, and Mr. Lewes of Mr. Conybeare? I think that each of these would have more sympathy, in modes of thought, with some writer of the Pauline age, than with some of the representative persons amongst our own contemporaries.† When Mr. Jowett is speaking of St. Paul's "mixed modes," he seems to forget that there is among ourselves any philosophy of the kind commonly called idealistic; and he actually denies that there is any theology which sincerely and intelligently uses St. Paul's language.

I have failed to discover to what school of philosophy Mr. Jowett himself belongs. When he is speaking most in his own person, he seems to fall into the language of

* Modern Painters, vol. iii. pp. x., 343, 344.

† Mr. J. S. Mill, himself one of the most carefully accurate and most "modern" of thinkers, in his work on 'Logic,' vol. i. p. 49, says—"To what "degree this loose mode of classing and denominating objects has rendered "the vocabulary of mental and moral philosophy unfit for the purposes of "accurate thinking, is best known to whoever has most reflected on the pre-"sent condition of those branches of knowledge." "It would be well if "this natural degeneracy of language took place only in the hands of the "ignorant vulgar; but some of the most remarkable instances are to be "found in terms of art, and among technically educated persons." "And "the fact, that no questions which have arisen in the moral sciences have "been subjects of keener controversy than the definitions of almost all the "leading expressions, is a proof how great an extent the evil to which we "have adverted has attained."

those who urge the cultivation of "the religious sense," as distinguished from what they call dogmas. The "inward life of the soul," which is to be patience, candour, charity, is what Mr. Jowett most naturally dwells upon. But as he does not consistently speak in the phraseology of that school, we must not identify him with it. So that we are driven to take him by himself, and to inquire whether he himself is remarkable, as contrasted with St. Paul, for uniformity in the use of language, and distinctness of conceptions.

If there is one term, in the use of which a philosophical writer is especially called upon to be definite and uniform, it is unquestionably the word "idea." There is no other word of equal dignity in philosophy; no other, of which the careless use has been so injurious to metaphysical science; no other, in behalf of which recent illustrious philosophers have so earnestly pleaded for precision and uniformity. Moreover, this is a word which a Commentator on St. Paul is bound by an additional duty to his author to treat carefully and respectfully, as he would if he were commenting on Plato or Coleridge. Let us see how Mr. Jowett has used these words "idea" and "ideal,"—whether he has found himself under the tyrannous necessity which he assumes, of applying them in one sense only.

In the following passages an "idea" appears to mean a figment:—

"Sometimes they" [righteousness, truth, love, &c.] "are attributes of God, in other passages qualities in "man; here *realities*, there *mere ideas*." (Vol. ii. p. 92.) (Obviously "realities" cannot be used in the sense of visible or sensible things.)

"Their perfection" [that of abstract ideas] "consists,

" as their very name implies, in their idealism; that is, " in their negative nature." (Vol. ii. p. 89.)

" Further, we may remark, that the combat, as it " deepens, becomes more ideal,—that is, removes fur- " ther away from the actual experience of mankind." (Vol. ii. p. 186.)

In contrast with " real evils by which we are sur- " rounded," we are told, " it is not only in the political " world that ideal and imaginary forms of evil present " themselves." (Vol. ii. p. 440.) In the same Essay, " the Law," is said to have been to St. Paul " an ideal " form of evil." " The world " is strangely spoken of as " a *neutral* power of evil." (Vol. ii. p. 299.)

" The one ideal, the other real." (Vol. i. p. 412.)

I think we shall be doing Mr. Jowett no injustice if we take him to mean by " idea," in these and similar passages, a creation of the human mind,—a sense which anti-idealist philosophers have always claimed the right to give it.

It should be said, that Mr. Jowett nowhere explains his own use of any word; he always assumes that " we" cannot help using words in one invariable sense. So also, he says, " The language of the Greek philosophy " is, on the whole, precise and definite. What Plato " and Aristotle meant by εἶδος and οὐσία is hard to con- " ceive, but their use of the words does not waver in " successive sentences:" (vol. ii. p. 93.) Such wavering is more common " in Scripture than in any other " book." But the " confusion " of St. Paul is partly to be explained by comparison of him with the Jewish Alexandrian writings. A peculiar kind of " idealism," very strange to us, is said to characterize both.

This " idealism " is " a tendency to realise and speak

" of all things in reference to God and the human soul." (Vol. ii. p. 93.) (Here, by the way, " realise " appears to mean " conceive of.") According to " the personi- " fying character of the age, ideas in the New Testament " are relative to the mind of God or man." (Vol. ii. p. 94.) Again: " The relation which St. Paul supposes " between Jew and Gentile is wholly ideal; that is, in " the purposes of God." (Vol. ii. p. 13.)

The reader will scarcely believe that Mr. Jowett speaks seriously of this idealising tendency as something unknown to modern philosophy and modern thought, and as creating a difficulty which " forces upon us the " fact, that the use of language and the mode of thought " are different in the writings of the Apostle from what " they are amongst ourselves." He illustrates it largely, pointing out that, however strange it may appear, " There is ever the tendency, in the New Testament, " to speak of good, and virtue, and righteousness, as " inseparable from the Divine nature, while in evil of " every sort a reflection of conscience seems to be " included. The words δικαιοσύνη, ἀλήθεια, ἀγάπη, are " not merely equivalent to righteousness, truth, love, " but connect imperceptibly with 'the Author and " Father of lights.'" (Vol. ii. p. 24.) It is hard to resist a suspicion that Mr. Jowett is speaking throughout in a strain of sarcastic irony, merely taunting modern philosophers and theologians with being not so sincere as St. Paul. On the whole, however, I do not venture to adopt this opinion, but feel obliged to put the question, whether this language of the New Testament does not correspond to the *fact;* and if so, whether there is any confusion in the use of it? It may appear more logical and precise for us not to " personify " righteousness (by

which Mr. Jowett means, let the logical reader observe, to "connect it with a person";*) but supposing that it *is* "connected with a person," we shall buy our precision dearly. At any rate, St. Paul ought to be judged as most eagerly asserting what Mr. Jowett rather plumes himself on detecting, as a source of confusion, in his language. No wonder that Mr. Jowett finds innumerable difficulties in understanding St. Paul, when he does not choose to start from St. Paul's cardinal belief. Those to whom Modern Thought is a *summus Pontifex*, might at least imitate the Jesuit editors of the 'Principia,' and give St. Paul the benefit of his own hypothesis, even if they are compelled to reject it themselves. "Newtonus in hoc tertio libro telluris motæ "hypothesin assumit. Autoris propositiones aliter expli- "cari non poterant, nisi eâdem quoque factâ hypothesi. "Hinc alienam coacti sumus gerere personam. Cæterum "latis a summis Pontificibus contra telluris motum "decretis nos obsequi profitemur." St. Paul's language, as many who have studied it are ready to testify, will be found rigorously precise, if only the centre round which all his thoughts revolve be clearly apprehended. It is the language of a man speaking frankly of what he knows, not caring much about his expressions, but unconsciously expressing himself with wonderful accuracy, because he sees so clearly what he means. He may contradict himself as far as mere words go, but his contradictions only serve to bring out more fully the true harmony of his thoughts.

* Would Mr. Jowett consider it a sign of an inveterate tendency to "personify" in an American slave-holder, that he seemed unable to think of a negro except in connection with an owner? It has been generally said that it proves a culpable inability to personify—the poor negro.

If "existing modes of thought" are to be allowed to prescribe that man has nothing to do with God, and if a clean separation between "a quality in man" and "an "attribute of God" be a condition of precise reasoning, then I grant all that Mr. Jowett affirms as to St. Paul's unintelligibility. But while a large part of what Mr. Jowett has written seems to me fairly to imply that premiss, it would be unjust to him as a theologian to admit that he is consistent on this point. Even in the Essay in which some of his most offensive statements are made, he goes on timidly to undermine what he has been saying, by allowing that the "mixed modes" of the Gospel have a third cause, beyond its being preached to the uneducated, and incrusted with Alexandrian phraseology,—namely, that "its subject is mixed, and, "as it were, intermediate between God and man." "Its ideas are in a state of transition and oscillation." What evil genius prevented Mr. Jowett from recognising at once that God and man are *in contact*, so that "oscil- "lation" is out of the question? In his concluding Essay, he seems to have entirely abandoned "modern modes "of thought," and become Pauline and idealist himself. Here, it is delightful to find, he recognises what is the one and only common dogma of modern philosophy—the supreme authority of facts. This, indeed, we are able to trace as an abiding influence of the Bacouian reform, that every modern thinker, whatever his metaphysics may be, is willing to appeal to facts. The most Pauline or Platonic idealist claims, equally with the most Aristotelian positivist, to rest his belief not on speculation, but on the facts of the universe. Except in this Essay, Mr. Jowett, though never ceasing to appeal to modern modes of thought, does not avail himself of

this principle. Here he leaves the modes of thought behind, and, by contact with his mother earth, becomes himself stronger and clearer. "Not words, but facts, "are the basis of abstract ideas, as of all our other ideas." Still, however, he is more timid than he need be. "Theology, it is true, can never stand exactly in the "same relation to fact as physical science. Yet, on the "other hand, it cannot be wholly separated from it." But he ventures to use, in his own name, such language as the following: "God is present in our actions, ... "as the law of all other laws, the person, idea, principle, "fact, in which they are gathered up." Lastly, he justifies St. Paul, by stating the following as "a fact "gathered from the spiritual experience of mankind.— "As in prayers, as in mere earthly affection, we become "one with God and one another; so in our whole spiri- "tual nature we are one with a Divine Being."

I will venture to affirm that the difference between the Epistle to the Hebrews and St. Paul's Epistles, though Mr. Jowett regards them as irreconcileable, is nothing like the difference between this last Essay and some of those which precede it. I regret to have to go back from it, to give some instances in which Mr. Jowett "personifies" ambiguously, after the manner which he attributes to St. Paul, and "confuses subject with object." *

The words Religion, Faith, Christianity, Judaism, are used by Mr. Jowett, as by other modern writers, in a reckless variety of senses, till one is hopelessly lost among them. Take this as an example of "personifica- "tion." "In the wreck of the heathen religions, Judaism

* "It has been shown in other places, that such a confusion of the objective and subjective is quite in harmony with St. Paul's style."—Vol. ii. p. 300

" alone seemed to remain unchanged. . . . *It contained* " *in itself that inward life* which other religions were " seeking for, and for the want of which they expired. " It taught as an article of faith the unity of God, . . . " with the idea of which *it gave the power* to believe it." (Vol. ii. p. 18.) There is nothing in St. Paul so rhetorically ambiguous as that. Again of Judaism: " Such " a 'let,' even *when it had lost its inspired character,* " was the law of the Jews." (vol. i. p. 182.) When we read such a sentence as this: " The expectation of the " day of the Lord was not a belief, but a necessity in " the early Church," (Vol. i. p. 98,) who will not say that the writer is falling into the slipshod style of a Review ? Yet this is a specimen of Mr. Jowett's more precise language, for he prefixes to it the words, " Strictly speaking." Two pages on, he says, " The belief in the coming " of Christ was transformed from being outward to " becoming inward." How can " a belief " be outward ? A similar " mixed mode " appears in the following sentences from vol. ii. p. 398, " The heathen religions " belong to an age in which *morality has not yet made* " *itself conscious to* the minds of men." . . . " His very " existence" [that of the Grecian god] " was a sort of ne- " cessity to the Grecian mind, without which the State " could not exist; his attributes were not the result of " contemplation, or even the creation of fancy; but fixed " by tradition and local legend, equally ready to conse- " crate good and evil, or rather without the capability " of discerning between them." Mr. Jowett is introducing an original confusion into modern language by using " conscious " in that peculiar construction. And surely the genesis of Grecian mythology given in the latter sentence is puzzling. One would have understood,

from the first part of it, that the Grecian mind created the Grecian god; but then it must have created him, as we find, by some mysterious process with which neither contemplation nor fancy had anything to do. His attributes were "fixed" by tradition and local legend; we are not told, however, where Tradition and Local Legend found them before they fixed them, but only that these fixing powers were incapable of moral discernment.

But I shall gladly pass on from thus retorting on Mr. Jowett the charge of loose and ambiguous thought which he brings against St. Paul, to consider some of the great topics on which I think the testimony of St. Paul more clear and authentic than that of his commentator, passing over a multitude of minor instances in which it would be easy to vindicate the Apostle's accuracy. One instance, however, of his determination to make out a case against St. Paul's reasoning, is so curious and significant, that I must give it, contenting myself with this one sample. The Apostle cries out, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from "the body of this death? Thanks be to God through "Jesus Christ our Lord." His annotator, after speaking of "the difficulty of explaining" these words, because the question asked does not receive a direct answer, remarks: "This is one of the many passages in the "Apostle's writings, which lead us to conclude that he "dictated rather than himself wrote. Such a slip in the "construction could hardly have occurred to any one "with the written page before him." Really, one is at a loss to imagine by what rules of expression Mr. Jowett would bind down St. Paul.

I have already alluded to the necessity of referring all

the Apostle's thoughts and expressions to that which was central and predominant in his own mind. Mr. Jowett surprises us by stating this governing principle, now and then, plainly enough. Unhappily, modern modes of thought prevent him from carrying it with him into all that St. Paul says. "The Person of Christ "Himself is his centre in every Epistle, however various "may be his modes of expression." (Vol. i. p. 4.) "All "things in their highest aspect, churches, individuals, "the actions, feelings and words of men, are in God and "Christ; they pass out of themselves into union with "the Divine nature. Such modes of expression are no "longer in use among ourselves; to the best of men "they would appear mystical." (Vol. i. p. 40.)

II. I take then, for our second point, *St. Paul's view of Christ, as the King and Head of mankind;* in order that I may remark upon what Mr. Jowett says concerning the Coming of Christ, and concerning Justification.

Mr. Jowett holds that an important change took place, during St. Paul's career as an Apostle, in his view of Christ. This change is made by him the key to the explanation of the Epistles to the Thessalonians, and he finds it described by St. Paul himself in 2 Cor. v. 16, which is prefixed as a motto to these Epistles. The words are these: Εἰ καὶ ἐγνώκαμεν κατὰ σάρκα Χριστόν, ἀλλὰ νῦν οὐκέτι γινώσκομεν. From these, supported by some other incidental hints, and by the character of the Epistles to the Thessalonians, it is gathered that St. Paul, during the earlier period of his Apostleship, including the time when he wrote those letters, "preached Christ "according to the flesh." "In general terms, it may be "explained as the knowledge of Christ in a more Jewish

" and less Christian manner, from without rather than " from within,—a knowledge of him, *the very antithesis* " *of that* which St. Paul speaks of in his later Epistles, " as 'the life hidden with Christ in God.'" It is this Judaizing or carnal knowledge of Christ which accounts for the prominence which the Coming of Christ occupies in the Epistles to the Thessalonians.

Never, I believe, was there a theory more easy to refute. In the passage from the Corinthians, the Apostle is expounding that new constitution (*καινὴ κτίσις*) of men in Christ, in virtue of which they are no longer to be regarded as separate individuals, but as bound together in a mystical union with Him. His first thought is about his fellow-men: 'Wherefore henceforth, 'since the love of Christ has been manifested, we know 'no man after the flesh, but after his spiritual relation to 'Christ. Christ, too, if He has been known as a separate 'person, is now to be known only as the Head of men, 'binding them together in the spiritual constitution.' With reference to Mr. Jowett's interpretation of the words, (1) it can by no means be assumed as certain that St. Paul, in saying "we," is speaking of himself. (2) If that is assumed, St. Paul might as fairly be taken to refer to his thoughts about Christ *before* his conversion as after. (3) The "if" does not imply as a certainty that "we" had at any time "known Christ after " the flesh." The supposition might be thrown in merely for the purpose of more completely rejecting the notion.

Mr. Jowett finds no better confirmation of his theory from St. Paul's other writings than the following. He says that Gal. v. 11,—"And I, brethren, if I yet preach " circumcision, why do I yet suffer persecution? Then " is the offence of the Cross ceased,"—" can have no

" other meaning than that St. Paul had once preached " what his opponents declared to be the doctrine of the " circumcision." This inference turns, of course, on the literal meaning of ἔτι, "any longer." But upon the similar passage in the same Epistle, εἰ ἔτι ἀνθρώποις ἤρεσκον, " if I any longer pleased men," Mr. Jowett, with a truer critical tact, notes, "*Not* that there had " been a time when he was a pleaser of men." The next passage adduced is that in which St. Paul declares that he " forgets those things that are behind, and " reaches forth to those things that are before." On this I will make no comment. Nor is it much more necessary to show that such a change as is supposed derives no evidence from such passages as these: " To the Jews " became I as a Jew;" " And I, brethren, could not " speak unto you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal." For will any one say that in these St. Paul is *condemning himself?* I confidently accept these passages as a confession that there is no good evidence whatever of St. Paul's being conscious of such a change in his own views. They have never been taken, by readers unburdened with this theory, to mean what Mr. Jowett sees in them; and this meaning is utterly inconsistent with all their context. With his curious uncertainty, Mr. Jowett says that this change was " half concealed " from the Apostle himself:" but does he not see that the language which he quotes, if it means at all what he supposes, is extremely strong? " Preaching Christ after " the flesh," " preaching circumcision," " speaking car- " nally,"—these are not in St. Paul's mouth faint or doubtful expressions.

Then, what overwhelming evidence there is on the other side! Is it conceivable, that St. Paul for " more

"than fourteen years" should have been preaching what he himself calls a "carnal" Gospel, and yet should have had the audacity to write as he does to the Galatians? Surely no plea of "confusion" and inevitably illogical conceptions can in such a case excuse the assumption which he makes throughout, that from the first he had preached one Gospel, the very Gospel which he accused the Galatians of wishing to desert, the Gospel which he describes in Gal. ii. 20, by language which Mr. Jowett is fond of quoting to express the highest development of the Pauline teaching, "the very antithesis" of the supposed earlier knowledge of Christ.

The Epistle to the Philippians is selected by Mr. Jowett as the one in most marked contrast with those to the Thessalonians. In these "he was waiting for the Son "from heaven;" in that he was "no longer so waiting, "but desirous to depart and to be with Christ." How is it, then, that in this Epistle he emphatically alludes to "the day of Jesus Christ" twice within the ten first verses? Is there not in Phil. i. 28, the same thought as in 2 Thess. i. 6—10? Does not the Apostle again refer to "the day of Christ," ii. 16? How is it that, close to the very verses in which Mr. Jowett conceives him to be abjuring the doctrine of the Thessalonian Epistles, he declares that "from heaven we look for the Saviour, the "Lord Jesus Christ?" How is it that in iv. 5, he clenches an exhortation by reminding them, "The Lord is at "hand?"—I have taken this Epistle because it is the one from which Mr. Jowett draws his chief evidence that St. Paul, in the later part of his life, was so far from "waiting for the Son from heaven," that he reproached himself with this expectation as a carnal knowledge of Christ.

If St. Paul was mistaken in his expectation of the Day of the Lord, it is useless to pretend that he ever grew out of this mistake. It is the common mistake of our Lord Himself and His Apostles, to the end of their lives. What they predicted, the author of the Apocalypse declares that he saw. This difficult subject may be reduced to the simple issue,—Were the events which occurred in "that generation," when considered according to their actual bearings in the Divine Government of the world, such as to justify the designation,—the Coming (παρουσία) of the Lord,—or not? Suppose St. Paul himself, with purged eyesight, to look back on that time, would he now confess that he used language beyond or beside the facts? In order to answer this question, we must have a clearer and more distinct conception of the relation of the spiritual to the temporal, of the inward to the outward, than Mr. Jowett exhibits. He continually assumes that outward events, the conduct of men, political principles, have nothing whatever to do with the "unseen world," "the world of the human "heart." He takes for granted that those who are occupied with the one must be withdrawn from the other. Accordingly, as there is no question that St. Paul and the early Christians were looking for outward signs of Christ's kingdom, he is driven to speak of them as comparatively sense-bound. One way of answering the question, "Why the faith of the first Christians did not "exactly coincide with our own?" is to say, "that the dif- "ference of the modes of thought of that age and our own "rendered it impossible, humanly speaking, that the veil "of sense should be altogether removed." (Vol. i. p. 99.) "In every age of enthusiasm," he strangely remarks, "men have been apt to walk by sight, and not by faith."

(Vol. i. p. 11). The Kingdom which the first converts expected "was *not* eternal and heavenly, *but* very near "and present, ready to burst forth everywhere, and by "its very nearness seeming to touch our actual human "state." The *contrast* between "eternal and heavenly," and "near and present," is remarkable. Of course Mr. Jowett is compelled, in numberless places, to remark at the same time that all the views of the early converts were "mystical" and "spiritual." He does not except from this description the Thessalonians themselves. He even traces the expectation of which we are speaking, to "the intensity of the spiritual state in which they lived, "so far beyond that of our daily life."

To one who holds that all visible objects, all actions and events, are *in*separable from the unseen world, and are but the vestures through which spiritual realities manifest themselves, the phenomena which so confound Mr. Jowett are quite consistent. And one might have hoped that a view in which Goethe coincides with St. Paul, and which to the ears of this generation is so earnestly preached by such thinkers as Maurice, Carlyle, and Ruskin, would not have been treated by Mr. Jowett as non-existent. According to this view, he who is most spiritual will look with most awe and intelligence upon temporal things, because he sees in them that inward meaning of which they are the authentic exponents. A believer in Christ, persuaded that the King of the unseen world had come to His own, and been rejected by them, and that He was about to manifest Himself in His character as the incarnate Lord of the world, would not be betraying in the slightest degree the loftiest or the deepest of his spiritual intuitions, if he looked for changes in the world as the natural signs of Christ's appearing in majesty.

Was that epoch, truly understood, such a crisis in the world's history as to the eye of an enlightened believer would betoken a revelation of the Lord? Obviously, in endeavouring to answer this question, we must get rid of such modes of thought as are merely carnal, that is, blind and stupid. We must think of the world as spiritually created and spiritually governed. We must measure facts not by their outward largeness, but by their force. We must assume the premisses of St. Paul, thinking with him of God's order as manifesting itself in the events of time and place, believing with him that the God-man had appeared, and had just gone up through the heavens, to fill and govern all things. And we must put ourselves "en rapport" with the language of Jewish prophecy.

I have no doubt that Mr. Jowett, if he had boldly taken up such a point of view, would have been able to give very important help towards the solution of this question. He is clearly not insensible, as it is, to the mighty significance of the things transacted within that half century. Speaking without reference to the question of the Coming, he says of that time, "All things were "coming to the birth, some in one way, some in another. "The supports of custom, of opinion, of tradition, had "given way; human nature was, as it were, thrown "upon itself, and the guidance of the Spirit of God." (Vol. i. p. 84.) He perceives, what is very important to notice, that both St. Paul and St. John spoke of things existing at the moment when they wrote as the beginnings of that for which they were looking. The Kingdom itself, the Day, the Wrath, were not to be novelties: they already existed. Already they were in part proving themselves to exist. The prophecy was not that some-

thing not homogeneous with things present was to burst forth; but that the spiritual power already in operation would come out into distinct victory. In the Essay on the Man of Sin, Mr. Jowett has to show how St. Paul's language accords with something which could be predicated of the time when he was writing. In this Essay, accordingly, all St. Paul's language is taken to be "spi- "ritual." "He is no longer walking upon the earth, and "only in a figure beholds the things of earth." If we can approve of the manner, "spiritual" or other, in which St. Paul speaks of things present, and not find his descriptions exaggerated or fantastic, and if we go on to interpret on similar principles the language he held concerning the future, we shall be very much inclined, I think, to admit that the prophecies of our Lord and of His Apostles were fulfilled, and that there was in that generation a great appearing of the Lord, which was truly a winding up of an old world, and beginning of a new one. If we could follow the workings of the mystery of iniquity,—of the Antichristian power or principle,— till it culminated at Jerusalem, and take in the awful significance of the destruction of the Holy City and Temple, measuring its importance as we do that of the Call of Abraham or of our Lord's Crucifixion, we might gradually learn to acquiesce in the New Testament language concerning τὰ τέλη τῶν αἰώνων. "The over- "throw of such a power would have seemed to the "prophets of the old world a day of the Lord indeed, "immeasurably more wonderful, more pregnant, more "a pledge of future blessings, than the downfall of "Sennacherib or Belshazzar. But when it was con- "nected with the incarnation, the death, and the resur- "rection of the Son of man, it could be looked upon as

" nothing else than His appearance to claim the Kingdom " which He had proved to be His Father's, and which " the power of evil was seeking to wrest from Him."— (Maurice, Unity of the New Testament, p. 613.)

I am afraid that Mr. Jowett would draw a broad line between this subject, and that of *Justification*. But in St. Paul's mind they would have been closely connected. He could scarcely think of Christ as the Lord of the world without remembering that He was the Righteous Head of men. All living Righteousness was in Him, whether contemplated as outward in the government of the world, or as inward, for the soul of man.

My complaint of Mr. Jowett here again is, that he wavers. He sometimes states fairly enough St. Paul's view, and then he seems to let it go from his own grasp, and turns from the great Pauline principle to " the sentiment " of religion," and " the individual soul," and " personal " holiness." He has a natural antipathy to the Reformation struggle, and maintains, adventurously enough, that Luther and his fellow-Reformers were more schoolmen than their opponents, meeting one dogmatic system by another,—" the scholastic divinity having become a " charmed circle, out of which no man could venture, " though he might oppose or respond within it." " Why " was this?" he asks. " Why not repeat, with a slight " alteration of the words rather than the meaning of the " Apostle, neither justification by faith nor justification " by works, but 'a new creature?' " Let me put it to Mr. Jowett, whether St. Paul did not mean nearly the same by καινὴ κτίσις, that Luther meant by "justifica- " tion by faith?" It does not appear that this κτίσις *meant*, directly, a change of heart, though, according to St. Paul's view, it implied and demanded it: it rather

describes that constitution in Christ, according to which a man is identified with Christ, and is *in* Him. It is on this that St. Paul's "justification" rests, and, I still venture to think, Luther's also. So Mr. Jowett truly remarks: "We are described as dead with Christ, we "live with Him, we are members of His body, we follow "Him in all the stages of His being. All this is another "way of expressing, 'We are justified by Faith.'" (Vol. ii. p. 456.) Unhappily Mr. Jowett considers such language as more or less needing an apology; and he attempts to show that this really meant no more than various modern notions, of which, in his peculiar way, he assumes the soundness or necessity, till he sinks to death-bed religion, and "final assurance" resting on the consciousness of very strong faith. "Not in the fulness "of life and health, nor in the midst of business, nor in "the schools of theology; but in the sick chamber, "where are no more earthly interests, and in the hour of "death, we have before us the living image of the truth "of justification by faith, when man acknowledges, on "the confines of another world," his own unworthiness and God's mercy. What hint is there in St. Paul, or any other Scriptural writer, that the death-bed is, in any sense, more properly the scene of justification, than the arena of life?

Would it not be the true key to all facts of experience, as it certainly is to all St. Paul's language, to accept the truth revealed to him,—Man in Christ, and Christ in Man,—and to see that man's only righteousness and blessedness are in acknowledging this as the law of his being? This definition of man's righteousness defines sin and evil also. For if man's only true course is to submit himself to a Higher, and feel that he is nothing

in himself, then his sin is to stand in himself, and turn away from the Source of Righteousness. Faith is simply acting according to our true nature, inasmuch as we *are* nothing in ourselves, but in the Son of God are all that our Maker intended us to be. Self-dependence is contradicting our true nature, and is, therefore, the source of countless anomalies.

I have no wish to extract the mystery from this revelation, but I maintain that, while it is deeply mysterious as a fact, it is thoroughly tenable as a truth. Amidst Mr. Jowett's solutions and modifications, we welter as in a chaos. We never seem to arrive at any ground, or any unity; the only conclusion he leads us to is, that things are infinitely confused, and we must try to be as good as we can. St. Paul, on the contrary, while he faces all difficulties and all miseries, draws out of each of them a confirmation of the Gospel he proclaims, that, in order to be true and righteous and infinitely blest, man has nothing to do but to submit himself to a righteous and loving God, and that no departures or rebellions have been able to overcome that grace which seeks to restore for all and each the original order. This order, according to St. Paul, was perfectly manifested in Jesus Christ, in whom it ever subsisted. The truth thus expressed in abstract terms can be best brought home to men in the language of simple facts, such as St. Paul uses; but it will bear any kind of true philosophical investigation. Is it not in perfect accordance with any sound modern philosophy to say that this view presents *the ultimate law* of man's being, such law being liable to the same test as every other law, viz. the interpretation of facts? In that case, there is no need for Mr. Jowett to excuse St. Paul in the following manner:—"There

"appeared to the Apostle a certain fitness in Christ being "like us. . . . . The Apostle's view . . . from its not "having passed into the language of Creeds and Articles, "and perhaps, even, from its mystical character, has "fallen out of daily use . . . . . We cannot precisely "analyse what the Apostle meant by this 'identity,' "the superficial form of which is due to the peculiar "rhetorical character of the age, the deeper and hidden "thought being that both inwardly and outwardly, as "He was, so ought we to be,—so are we in this world." (Vol. ii. p. 330.) If it were asked, "*Why* ought we?" the language which Mr. Jowett calls superficial and rhetorical would give the reason why; that reason being simply the "Divine idea," or the eternal "*fact*" of things.

When once this is apprehended, the broad and sweeping statements of St. Paul concerning the justification of all men in Christ, their spiritual Head, and their condemnation in Adam, their fleshly Head, will be seen to be the deepest also,—owing, indeed, their breadth to their depth. There is nothing to modify or qualify in them. God's purpose and order are absolute, and they are living: the contradictions to the order are simply marrings of it, which the Living God is continually striving against. Man has the power and the tendency to live in himself and to himself, but not without misery and confusion: his wisdom and blessedness are to live in Christ and for Christ.

Faith, then, is said to justify, because, if we had not dogmatized it into "a subjective principle," and other hollow entities, it would express to us, better than any other term, the spirit or thought of one who casts away himself and leans on Christ. Mr. Jowett, according to his wont, at one time adopts the worst modern notion

about Faith, and at another time denies it. In his Introduction to the Epistle to the Romans, he says, that "nations of every *language* and *tongue*" (sic) were to be united by a "principle." "In other words, it could not "be an institution or a Church, but an inward principle, "which might belong alike to all mankind. This prin- "ciple was Faith." (Vol. ii. p. 22.) And again, St. Paul is placed above Philo, because "it was he, St. Paul, "who, as far as we know, first dwelt upon faith as an "abstract principle." (Vol. ii. p. 31.) I need only put against this, from vol. i. p. 233, "It is this thought and "image of Christ, not freedom or faith, or any form of "the subjective principle, which is the primary idea of "the Gospel in the mind of the Apostle,"—and so leave the subject of Justification.

III. *The relation of the Kingdom of Christ to actual society* is a point on which Mr. Jowett's un-Pauline conception of "Religion," as a provision for the individual mind, leads him into the most surprising assertions. A morbid desire to deal honestly with actual facts, combined with a narrow apprehension of the New Testament maxims, seduces him into the tenet, that principles good for individual life are not to be intruded into society. He erects an impassable barrier between the New Testament teaching and the soul of man, on the one side, and the necessities of political and social life on the other. Thus he lays down the maxim, that "the Gospel gives counsels "of perfection; that is, principles which, in the mixed "state of human things, it is impossible to carry out in "practice." The reader will be appalled by the frank and innocent way in which Mr. Jowett adopts views which have been heretofore abandoned, so far as their

open avowal is concerned, to the most profligate of sophists. "Is the author using irony?"—one continually asks oneself. I wish I could think so.

Not to dwell long on this painful subject, I will only take one passage in illustration of what I am saying. That separation between the soul and outward life, of which I have just spoken, is implied in numberless passages. But that which I shall now quote is the most explicit. In the Essay on the Law as the Strength of Sin, Mr. Jowett expressly treats of society. He states certain positive facts, and then proceeds: "Hence arises a ne-
"cessary opposition between the moral principles of the
"individual, and the political principles of a state. . . .
"If moral and religious principles are to be applied to
"political questions,—if for the want of them the whole
"government of a country are to be consigned to the
"vengeance of heaven,—*if the rule is to be*, not, 'my king-
"dom is not of this world,' but, '*we ought to obey God*
"*rather than man*,'—there is nothing left but to super-
"sede civil society, and found a religious one in its
"stead. . . . If governments and nations appear unchris-
"tian, not less unchristian is the appearance of society
"itself. . . . Susceptible minds, attaching themselves,
"some to one point, some to another, may carry such
"reflections very far, until society itself appears evil, and
"they desire some primitive patriarchal mode of life.
"They are weary of conventionalities; they want, as
"they say, to make religion a reality; to place all men
"on a religious, social, political equality. In this, as in
"the last case, 'they are kicking against the pricks;'
"what they want is a society which has not the very
"elements of a social state; they feel the evil without
"comprehending the necessity of it; they do not recog-

" nise that the world is a mixed mass of good and evil,—
" evil held together by good, good inseparable from evil.
" That which they aim at for themselves and others is
" holy, just, and good; but, in the attempt to carry it
" out, a mere principle of discord and dissolution. If
" we ask, Who shall deliver them from 'the body of this
" death,' and withdraw them from an unprofitable
" struggle? the only answer is, that they must retire
" into themselves, and seek to embody within that ideal
" which in his social state it is denied to man to attain.
" A slight error it seems, but not the less a fatal one, to
" confuse the inward and spiritual with what is outward
" and earthly,—the freedom of the individual with the
" imperfect necessity of our social action,—to identify
" morality with law, or Christian duties with political
" principles." (Vol. ii. p. 439.)

These are startling words, surely; but let us be honest enough to confess that, although the principle here so fearlessly avowed by Mr. Jowett would not be deliberately professed by any other respectable man living, and has not been so advocated since the time of Mandeville, yet the secret poison of it works in all schools, and endeavours to insinuate itself into every mind. Mr. Carlyle has somewhere designated this notion, that evil is to be tolerated, as the deadliest of all heresies. Its peculiar deadliness lies in the plausible forms which it assumes, by which it deceives the religious man as well as the politician, through which it cankers all trust in righteousness and the Righteous God, and all manful sympathetic action. We owe Mr. Jowett thanks for having set before us an image of our own worldliness and untruthfulness from which we cannot but turn away in horror.

Many things in Mr. Jowett's book would not cause one so much amazement and so much pain, if we were not bound to regard him as a thoughtful and well-informed man. Thus, with reference to this part of Mr. Jowett's philosophy, I could imagine an uneducated person, not practised in moral questions, saying some of the offensive things which we are now considering, without meaning them. He might be confused by the ambiguous application of the term "evil," and might say that the world is held together by good and evil, meaning only that trouble and temptation are made the means of developing the good in man. It would be a kindness in such a case to point out the danger of careless language, and to show that evil *necessarily implies sin*, and that, therefore, any one who encourages any sort of compliance with evil, bids a man sin himself, or consent to sin in others. An ignorant person might be reminded, that, if every living man were to seek successfully to embody within a moral ideal, the world, if depending for its coherence on evil, would go to pieces; for where would the evil come from? But it would be an impertinence to treat Mr. Jowett as a child playing with dangerous weapons of which he does not know the use. He would not write on morals without weighing his terms, nor without some acquaintance with the leading events of the history of morals. He is probably aware, therefore, that he is virtually repeating the doctrine of that Mandeville to whom I have referred; and he treats as worthless what was adduced in refutation of the doctrine.

But I wish the reader to see against what protestations Mr. Jowett re-asserts the great sophist theory. Mandeville, in the year 1714, published an argument to prove

that "Private Vices are Public Benefits." He did not mean to recommend vice. "When I assert that vices are "inseparable from great and potent societies, and that it "is impossible their wealth and grandeur should subsist "without, I do not say that the particular members of "them who are guilty of any should not be continually "reproved, or not be punished for them when they grow "into crimes." The effect to be hoped for from his writings was, "that, in the first place, the people who "continually find fault with others, by reading them "would be taught to look at home, and examining their "own consciences, *be made ashamed of always railing at "what they are more or less guilty of themselves;* and "that in the next, those who are so fond of the ease and "comforts, and reap all the benefits that are the con-"sequence of a great and flourishing nation, would learn "*more patiently to submit to those inconveniences which "no government upon earth can remedy,* when they should "see the impossibility of enjoying any great share of the "first, without partaking likewise of the latter." Mandeville thought that, in a primitive condition of society, good without evil might possibly have answered; but, for a complicated state of society, he thought such notions Utopian. He would not have ignorant fanatics shaking the vast system of modern society by their abstract principles. He thus sums up his view:—

> "Bare virtue can't make nations live
> In splendour; they that would revive
> A golden age must be as free
> For acorns as for honesty."

To some persons such a theory might seem to impeach Christianity, but the author had no such intention. "If "the too scrupulous reader should at first view condemn

"these notions concerning the origin of moral virtue, "and think them, perhaps, offensive to Christianity, I "hope he will forbear his censures, when he shall con- "sider that nothing can render the unsearchable depth of "the Divine wisdom more conspicuous, than that man," &c. &c.—which the reader's imagination may supply. Mandeville further says, that he found religious men just as much acquiescing in evil, under plausible disguises, with a view to keeping society together, as others. The doctrine met with much opposition. Bishop Berkeley, whose whole life was a war of extermination against social evil, could not patiently bear that what he thought the undermining of society should be asserted to be its support. He argued that every known form of evil would be seen, on thorough investigation, to be mischievous instead of beneficial to even the most complicated society. He showed that the notion of luxury benefiting trade was based upon a most narrow and superficial view of the facts. But he knew that the supporters of the doctrine claimed to be men whose distinction it was to look at *facts*. He puts the following language in their mouths: "Men of narrow capacities "and short sight, being able to see no further than one "link in a chain of consequences, are shocked at small "evils which attend upon vice; but those who can "enlarge their view, and look through a long series of "events, may behold happiness resulting from vice, and "good springing out of evil in a thousand instances." "All those who know the world do calculate that what "you call a good Christian, who hath neither a large "conscience nor unprejudiced mind, must be unfit for "the affairs of it." But the Bishop had no great opinion of the real largeness of view of these defenders

of evil:—"Those who have fallen in my way have been "mostly vain men of pleasure, old sharpers in business, "or a third sort of lazy sciolists, who are neither men of "business nor men of speculation, but set up for judges "or critics in all kinds, without having made a progress "in any. These, among men of the world, pass for "profound theorists, and among speculative men would "seem to know the world; a conceited race, equally "useless to the affairs and studies of mankind."

But instead of quoting more from the good Bishop, it will be to better purpose to give some of the far more vigorous and searching words which have been called forth in our own day by a republication of "Law's Answer to Mandeville." After pointing out that Law, taking the ground of abstract morals, maintains that evil is not the substantial part of any act or thought, but the destructive element in it, Mr. Maurice goes on: "It is not certainly to be assumed that one who has "acquired the habit of looking at what is good as the "substantial part of everything in the region of indivi- "dual life, will be able at once to transfer that habit to "social life; but at least he will find it a great shock "to his mind to recognise any other as if it had a "stronger stamp of morality and religion. If he has "learnt that the disorder in his own mind and character "is itself the witness to an order, he will not be easily "persuaded that any amount of disorder, in the relations "of men to each other, can bear an opposite witness. "If he be convinced that there is a permanent state of "being, which he must call his, as much when he is "most at variance with it as when he is most in accord- "ance with it, he will not be affected by any one's "telling him that there was a true state of society once,

"or that there may be a true state hereafter, but that "now all is incoherency and corruption. He may hail "with hearty joy all that he can find of purity and "goodness in the past; he may feel infinite longings "for the blessings he believes are reserved to man in the "future, but he can only understand that partial purity "and goodness of the past, that perfect purity and "goodness of the future, as the more distant or more "exact accordance with the truth of things, the truth of "which our consciences testify as living and present, "which our words and acts intimate that we are pro-"fessing to aim at, and need not war against. In this "spirit the Jewish prophets of old spoke to their coun-"trymen; they felt, indeed, that the days on which "they had fallen were days of grievous corruption—of "corruption which nothing but a tremendous judgment, "a day of the Lord, could purge away. But still they "spoke of the order as being there; the king, priest, "prophet, were he ever so rebellious or false, had each "his vocation, and might fulfil it; his position was "not less desirable than that of his forefathers, only he "had abused it more; the effect of any change would "be to unfold more thoroughly the meaning of the state "in which they were then living, and to bring those who "received the punishments rightly into practical submis-"sion to it. All sound conservatism, all sound reforma-"tion, seem to lie in this method; conservatism being "the preservation of the true sense and meaning of the "things which actually exist, reformation the separating "of it from its counterfeits. And here, too, seems to lie "the true religious view of the case, not in confounding "what is most pure and holy with what is most base, "under certain large formulas about general corrup-

"tion, but in showing how the tendency to evil in "man is manifested by his continually losing sight of "realities, and substituting vain shows and mockeries "for them.

"The practical politician, who honestly takes this "course, would certainly be obliged to abandon many "of his current maxims; he would not be able so easily "to cast in his lot with any one party of the state, and "to adopt its theory of action; he would not be able to "get so much credit with moralists when he is out of "office, for his bold denunciations of his opponent's "system, as utterly evil and abominable; nor so much "credit with easy men, when he is in office, for his clever "defences of any act or system, as the best under "existing circumstances. He will feel that in each "measure and system there is likely to be a true "meaning, a real object, which it is very stupid and "very wicked to cry down for any party purpose, and "that there is probably some base mixture with that "good purpose or with the means for effecting it, to "which no circumstances existing or not existing, no "trumpery generalities, no clever sarcasms, can recon-"cile the conscience of any honest man."

The following passage will commend itself to Mr. Jowett's readers: "In the assurance that it is his "vocation thus to come into contact with all that is "most real and practical, that a revelation from Heaven "proves itself by the light it throws upon the earth, "the theological student will tremble while he reflects "how much confusion he may be the means of intro-"ducing into other studies, and into human life . . . "Once sanction the doctrine that there is, or can be, a "diversity in kind between the mercy and justice of the

"perfectly Merciful and Just, and the mercy and justice "which He begets in His creatures, and these words "become mere counters, upon which we may put any "value, or traffic with in any way we please. It is idle, "then, to seek for any relation between social acts or "principles and individual acts or principles; all the "anomalies of the world easily assume the character of "laws; the theory that private vices are public benefits, "may be just as sound and rational as any other. "Determine, on the contrary, to maintain that He is "Light, and in Him is no darkness at all, and that the "pure essential Light is the source of every ray of it which "has ever cheered the universe," and you will have the deepest possible conviction "that the Eternal Right-"eousness and Law which dwell in the heart of the "Creator, do alone hold human society together, and "declare what at every moment of his life each of us is "meant to be."

It is surely to be regretted that all theology of a deeper kind, like this, is passed over by Mr. Jowett as if he did not imagine the possibility of it; and that foolish platform declamation is deliberately taken by him, after the manner of scoffers, as the fair exponent of Christian doctrine. We are accustomed to hear it deduced that the Christianity of the New Testament is unsuited to the age, because Exeter Hall clashes with the "Westminster Review:" but we have not hitherto felt bound to accept these, nor to pay much deference to any writer who proposed them, as the representatives of the Gospel and the age.

IV. Akin to the relation between the Kingdom of Christ and actual society, is that between *spiritual*

illumination and the natural character, involving the question of conversion.

Mr. Jowett abundantly admits the reality and importance of conversion in the case of the early Christians, and does not at all doubt the occurrence of it, *mutatis mutandis,* amongst ourselves. The question on which he wavers is, whether conversion, or the spiritual change generally so described, is the cause of order or disorder in the man; whether, as a rational being, he is the better or the worse for it? Sometimes Mr. Jowett implies the one answer and sometimes the other, without, however, appearing to hold distinctly that it may produce either effect as it happens.

I suppose the Scriptural and orthodox view of true conversion, and of any light received inwardly, is that it is bonâ fide *light.* Those who are changed or illuminated are thought to have a clearer knowledge of themselves, and a more real appreciation of the things about them, as well as a new vision of God. At the same time it is well understood that physical excitement of a disturbing kind may be mixed with, and mistaken for, a true quickening of the affections towards God. To discriminate between such disturbance and healthy spiritual life in any particular case may often be a practical difficulty: but theoretically it would be regarded as a matter of conscience to maintain that the knowledge of God and of heavenly things could not itself be a cause of confusion. To be "converted" is to be brought round to a right state; to be saved, is to be made sane, and not insane. He who knows God, knows his fellowmen, and all other things, the better for that knowledge. Mr. Jowett, on the contrary, insists that the fallacious expectations of the earliest Christians were properly due

to their conversion, inasmuch as "conversion is an ex-
"ception to the course of nature." He traces the belief in the Coming of Christ (forgetting that it was originally inculcated by our Lord Himself) to the excited state of the believers, and proceeds: "Let those who think this "is an imaginary picture, recall to mind and compare "with Scripture, either what they may have read in "books or experienced in themselves as the workings of "a mind suddenly converted to the Gospel. Such an "one seems to lose his measure of events and his true "relation to the world. While other men are going on "with their daily occupations, he only is out of sym-
"pathy with nature, and has fears and joys in himself, "which he can neither communicate nor explain to his "fellows." (Vol. i. p. 100.) "Such a belief . . . . "almost unavoidably withdrew men's thoughts from the "ordinary duties of life . . . . The *intensity of the "spiritual state* in which they lived, so far beyond that "of our daily life, *is itself the explanation of the spiri-
"tual disorder* which seems so strange to us in men "who were ready to hazard their lives for the truth, "and which was but the natural reaction against their "former state." (Vol. i. p. 103.) In a curious note on "revelation," Mr. Jowett says, "Reducible to no natural "laws, it is to our ordinary moral and spiritual nature "what peculiar cataleptic conditions are to our bodily "constitution." (Vol. i. p. 215.) In the same spirit he speaks repeatedly of the "ecstasy" of conversion, implying in all such language too plainly that there is something unnatural in the state of those who are spiritually enlightened or renewed. The conversion of St. Paul is taken by Mr. Jowett, as it has been by the Church generally, as the great typical example of all

conversion. Accordingly, St. Paul's state is partly described as being thus out of order. "The life of St. "Paul, compared with that of ordinary men, was super- "natural, a miracle, an ecstasy, a revelation, an inspiration "of the Lord." (Vol. i. p. 234.) St. Paul is "a prophet," and a prophet is one who "does not see clearly into "the laws of this world or the affairs of this world, but "has a light beyond, which reveals them partially in "their relation to another." (Vol. i. p. 295.) "He "who through Christ was crucified to the world, and "the world to him, was not in harmony with nature, "nor nature with him. The manly form, the erect step, "the fulness of life and beauty, could not have gone "along with such a consciousness as this, any more than "the taste for literature and art could have consisted "with the thought—'Not many wise, not many learned, "'not many mighty.'" (Vol. i. p. 299.) We are again and again reminded that St. Paul was entirely different from "great men" and "heroes;" that he was "a poor "decrepit being," one who could not have come into contact with profane literature without ceasing to be himself. Yet on this point the opposite assertions of Mr. Jowett are more than usually full and satisfactory. There is much that is beautiful and touching and true, in the Essays on St. Paul and Conversion. Thus we are told that, in the Apostle's character, "with what the "world terms mysticism and enthusiasm are united "a singular prudence and moderation, and a perfect "humanity, searching the feelings and knowing the "hearts of all men;" also "a kind of subtilty of mode- "ration, which considers every conceivable case and "balances one with another." (Vol. i. p. 300.) Of "the believer," Mr. Jowett says: "The attitude of his

" soul towards God is such as to produce the strongest " effects on his power of action. It leaves his faculties " clear and unimpassioned; it raises him into commu- " nion with nature and God; it places him above acci- " dents; it perfects strength in weakness; it gives the " assurance of a real and present possession of all " things, as St. Paul says:—'All things are ours, " 'whether life or death, or things present or things to " 'come.' It is the source of power and freedom; it " affords the perfect peace of a soul stayed on God." (Vol. ii. p. 215.) And again: "The Gospel . . . . is " a supernatural power, with which the elements them- " selves bear witness, endowed with a fulness of life, and " imparting life to all who receive it. It is a moral " principle which seems to set us right with the world, " with ourselves, and with God." (Vol. ii. p. 436.) Such passages make one ask in amazement, not merely how Mr. Jowett could contradict himself so flatly, but rather how one who thus apprehends the true character of spiritual enlightenment could bear to entertain and express those other notions which so caricature and dishonour it? If St. Paul was raised into communion with God and nature, why should he be less able than before to sympathize with whatever was divine and natural in the works of Phidias and Plato? Why should the fulness of life and beauty be antagonistic to an inward consciousness of Christ crucified? These are questions which, at this time especially, we cannot afford to leave unanswered or half-answered. God be praised for the answers which he is giving us to them, even for those which come from unexpected quarters. He is raising up men to testify with their mouths, and to prove by their deeds, that Christ, the crucified, is indeed the

Lord of the world and the King of men; that the most exquisite delight in the visible creation implies no enmity to the Maker of it; that to be united, in conscious submission, to the Source of Truth does not blunt the eye to the discernment of any truth; that all genuine nobleness, all human heroism which is not deceptive, is of the very spirit of St. Paul and of Christ. There is plenty of false philosophy, false art, false nobility, to which the doctrine of the Cross will be an Ithuriel's spear; but the new heaven of the risen Christ is not without a new earth to show it forth, which is the glorious inheritance of the meek, and will lavish its rewards on those who give up themselves. If there has been an attempt, which Mr. Jowett is right in denouncing, to clothe St. Paul with some classical drapery of eloquence, taste, and so forth, let us not be persuaded to forget that St. Paul was nevertheless a man in whose person the true dignity of human nature did not suffer, who knew well how to bear himself before kings, and philosophers, and mobs,—who was able to be all things to all men, *because* by manifestation of the *truth* he commended himself to every man's conscience in the sight of God.

V. The doctrine of the manner in which God has made Himself known to men, or *the true theory of religion, natural and revealed*, is related to the question which we have just been considering, in some such way as the race is related to the individual. One word on this latter point.—Mr. Jowett, I am sorry to say, too uniformly and consistently treats all corporate unity as a fiction. He assumes throughout that the conception of the Jewish people as a unity,—a conception implied everywhere in the Old Testament,—was a rude and

astonishing one: that it is a mark of our progress that, whereas the Jewish prophet believed in a national conscience, we only use the expression in a figure. In Mr. Jowett's judgment, this view contradicted and impaired the sense of individual responsibility; and one of the great changes which mark the teaching of St. Paul is that the idea of the individual has superseded the idea of the nation. Christianity, according to Mr. Jowett, and especially Pauline Christianity, deals with a man as a separate being, while under Judaism the individual was lost in the crowd. No wonder, I must again say, that St. Paul should seem confused to Mr. Jowett. The cardinal point of St. Paul's teaching, as it concerns men, is this,—that men are *not* to be regarded as separate individuals, but as limbs of the body of Christ. The Pauline view of the advance made in Christianity would be, that whereas under the Old Covenant, the *national* bond (far from being too corporate) was not corporate enough to bring out and sustain fully the true sense of individual responsibility, the revelation of the deeper and more spiritual, and therefore more prevailing bond which unites men in the Son of God, has power to teach every man what he is in himself, and what he is in relation to God and his fellow-men. Does Mr. Jowett's philosophy absolutely repudiate the theory that two truths, apparently in opposition to one another, may really be needful to each other's existence? One party in philosophy holds, no doubt, that opposite truths are antagonistic, and eager to destroy each other, and that the wise man stands in the middle between them, and holds them both at bay: but there is another party which believes that the more firmly and utterly we grasp the one truth, the better we shall be able to

apprehend its opposite; and to this party St. Paul belongs. To take a familiar example of this method, supposing pride and humility to be both good, as our consciences and our common speech testify, we have not to balance ourselves between the two, taking care not to be *too* proud or *too* humble; but we may be sure that the deepest humility will tend, at bottom, to prove itself one with the loftiest pride. And so we find, experimentally, the fact to be. Similarly, it will be found that the man who has the quickest and tenderest sense of his responsibility, will not be he who isolates himself most from his fellows, but he who believes that he *is*, not merely when he acknowledges it, but independently of his acknowledgment, bound in a "mystical" and spiritual, but most real, union with his fellows, so that he cannot live to himself or die to himself. This must at least be imagined, if not accepted, by any one who would understand St. Paul.

According to this view, we shall hardly feel that in passing from the manifestation of God in the individual soul to the revelation of Him in the religions of men, we are taking up a different subject. In both, we shall take light, in its most natural sense, and in its broadest application, to be equivalent to the knowledge of the true God, and to come down from Him alone. In both, darkness will be measured strictly by ignorance of the true God. We shall not care what spheres of thought or action we examine, nor how the phrases Religion, Morality, Reason, Civilization, may be applied: wherever we discover light and harmony, judged by sound, accepted, practical criteria, there we shall know that the Word of God is manifesting Himself to the consciences of His creatures.

Mr. Jowett's Essay on Natural Religion does not expressly contradict this view. On the whole it wavers and oscillates, perhaps, in a more perplexing degree than his other Essays. He professes to be feeling his way, with timidity and many apologies, towards the acknowledgment of Law, as appearing in this department of inquiry no less than in others. He is evidently embarrassed by an impression that law is hardly reconcilable with God. When will this monstrous assumption be abandoned,—that the discovery of order is anti-theistic? How the prophets and apostles must wonder, if they are aware that champions of God are suspicious of laws, and the advocates of law deniers of God. They taught that every discovery of order was an actual vision of the Living God. It was, indeed, especially as the Lawgiver that the men of the Old Testament spoke of God,—as telling the number of the stars, and giving statutes and ordinances unto Israel. "He sendeth forth his commandments upon "earth, *and his word runneth very swiftly.*" It is marvellous to see how little this conception of theirs was limited. Not only are the visible elements called upon to praise their Maker, because "He hath given them a law which "shall not be broken;" but "kings of the earth, and all "people, princes, and all judges of the world" are invited to testify that "his Name only is excellent, and his praise "above heaven and earth." With what a strong agricultural sense of the thing does Isaiah (xxviii. 24) talk of the laws to which the ploughman and the thresher are taught to conform,—the laws of the "wheat, and the ap-"pointed barley, and the rye, in their place," testifying that "this also cometh forth from the Lord of Hosts, "which is wonderful in counsel, and excellent in work-"ing." If then we are such degenerate Baconians as to

be afraid of law, instead of seeking for it as for hid treasure, let us not palm off our godlessness for reverence, nor let any one father our bad philosophy on the Bible. I do not deny that a devout inquiry into all the laws by which the world and society are governed may shake many modern notions; but I conceive that divines, above all others, are called upon to be content and rejoice in the removing of those things that are shaken, that those things which cannot be shaken may remain.

In the meantime, what *are* "our" notions, say about God in the visible creation? Mr. Jowett answers as follows: "Yet it is impossible that our own feeling to-"wards nature in the present day can be the same with "that of the Psalmist; neither is that of the Psalmist the "same with that of the Apostle; while in the book of "Job and Ecclesiastes we seem to catch the echo of a "strain different from either. To us God is not in the "whirlwind, nor in the storm, nor in the earthquake, but "in the still small voice. Is it not for the attempt to "bring God nearer to us in the works of nature than we "can truly conceive Him to be, that a poet of our own "age has been subjected to the charge of pantheism? "God has removed Himself out of our sight, that He "may give us a greater idea of the immensity of His "power. He has enabled us not merely to gaze with "the outward eye on the forms and colours of nature, "but in a measure also to understand its laws, to wander "over space and time in the contemplation of its mech-"anism, and yet to return again to 'the meanest flower "'that breathes' for thoughts such as the other wonders "of earth and sky are unable to impart." (Vol. ii. p. 389.)

In the last sentence, Mr. Jowett has expressed what we

all feel to be true, with that simple elegance which gives so great a charm to his style. With the foregoing sentence, I cannot but quarrel as questionable both in fact and in philosophy. And the question before that, I cannot at all understand. Which is it that illustrates the habit of our age—the attempt of the poet, or the charge of pantheism? Was the charge of pantheism just or unjust? Is such pantheism right or wrong? Was this poet the same as the interpreter of "the meanest flower "that breathes," of whom it seems "we" are disciples, or have we some more pantheistic poet than Wordsworth? Did Wordsworth foolishly attempt to bring God nearer to us in the works of nature than we can truly conceive Him to be, or do we accept and sympathize in his feelings about flowers and the rest? Lastly, do those who in our time are "most alive to the whole, through be- "holding the whole in the least,"* acknowledge themselves more separated in their feelings towards the God of nature from Isaiah and David, or from the mass of their cultivated contemporaries? I should like to refer this last question to the arbitration of Mr. Ruskin, or of Mr. Holman Hunt, or of Mr. Robert Browning, or of Mr. Kingsley.

Mr. Jowett's remarks on the Aspects of Nature are wound up rather unexpectedly by a reflection upon our inferiority to St. Paul. "How different is our admiration "of natural scenery from his simple reverence for the "works of God!" We seldom meet with anything so like praise and blame in Mr. Jowett's pages. He writes generally with the impartiality of a natural historian,

* Willst du dich am Ganzen erquicken,
So musst du das Ganze im Kleinsten erblicken.—GOETHE.

indicating phenomena, and endeavouring to classify them under heads, without moralizing or preaching.

But if any antipathy is discernible in Mr. Jowett, it is to the religions of men, apart from revelation. His sense of the word Revelation is not one in which many theologians would agree, for he says that in the ancient world "there is one stream of revelation only—the Jewish;"* and he even defines this so as to put "the patriarchs "before revelation." I suppose Mr. Jowett accepts the popular language which identifies Revelation with the Bible, and therefore consistently makes it begin with Moses. Modern philosophies have generally recognised more of a Divine element in the religions of the world than Mr. Jowett will at all allow. His refinement is shocked into something like warmth by the grossness and barbarities and immoralities which deformed early religions. His individualism is offended by their "polit-"ical" character. Inasmuch as they were "the bond of "nations and of society, giving majesty to kings, and "authority to laws, linking men together in common acts "of worship," they were, of course, in Mr. Jowett's view, quite other than "moral." Morality was the offspring of philosophy, "when the eye of the soul turned inwards "upon itself." "Even in that philosophy which ex-"cluded the idea of a Supreme Being, the lesson which "was taught was far more 'divine' than the capricious "forms of superstition and unjust notions of barbarous "ages." The correct view of the comparative worth of various religions and philosophies is not, perhaps, of any cardinal importance. Our opinions about them will depend on other deeper convictions. Those who regard

* Nevertheless, we are told in another place, that "Christianity is the "*confluence* of a thousand channels of thought and feeling." (Vol. ii. p. 412.)

political and social life as *un*moral, as Mr. Jowett professes to do, and who make a refined taste the law of belief, as many readers will be inclined to suppose that Mr. Jowett does, will, of course, differ widely from those who cannot even conceive of morality independently of politics, and who think there are roots and grounds of thought more precious than delicate feelings.

Under a third head of Natural Religions, Mr. Jowett goes on to speak of an interesting question, to the discussion of which he brings much freshness both of thought and of illustration. He examines what is rather difficult to describe in one word, but what he justly considers as a set of phenomena which may be dealt with together, viz. the received and generally unquestioned opinions of men at this time concerning religion,—"the sediment of "religion in the minds of men in general." No other man could have considered this subject in Mr. Jowett's perfectly calm and unimpassioned spirit. He points out (while he seems to be begging his readers to believe that it doesn't in the least signify), that the received reasons for believing in a God are groundless, and that the ordinary thoughts and ways of men, though perfectly satisfactory and delightful as far as this world and morality are concerned, are entirely aloof from the doctrines of the Gospel. There are many men, he says, pure in morals, disinterested and sympathizing, stoically upright, and sensitively honourable, haters of profaneness, thankful and resigned, who "have never in their whole lives experi-"enced the love of God, or the sense of sin, or the need "of forgiveness. To the last, they are more interested "about the least concerns of this world than about the "greatest of another." I would entreat that these words may be weighed as carefully as they deserve. The simple,

direct inference from Mr. Jowett's observations is this, that men rest a fancied belief in a God on imaginary grounds, that they really do not believe in Him at all, and that the highest virtues are exhibited, and the world goes on famously, without a shadow of insight or sincerity in the things relating to another world. I could wish that in a matter of such transcendent importance, I could bring even a stronger contradiction to such views, from other parts of Mr. Jowett's book than the following: "Morality has no way to the heart of man; but the "Gospel reaches the feelings and the intellect at once. "In nations as well as individuals, in barbarous times as "well as civilized, in the great crises of history especially, "even in the latest ages, when the minds of men seem "to wax cold, and all things remain the same as at the "beginning, it has shown itself to be a reality without "which human nature would cease to be what it is. "Almost every one has had the witness of it in himself. "No one, says Plato, ever passed from youth to age in "unbelief of the gods, in heathen times. Hardly any "educated person in a Christian land has passed from "youth to age without some aspiration after a better life, "some thought of the country to which he is going."

"As a fact it would be admitted by most, that, at "some period of their lives, the thought of the world to "come and of future judgment, the beauty and loveliness "of the truths of the Gospel, the sense of the shortness "of our days here, have wrought a more quickening and "powerful effect than any moral truths or prudential "maxims. Many a one would acknowledge that he has "been carried whither he knew not; and had nobler "thoughts, and felt higher aspirations, than the course of "his ordinary life seemed to allow. These were the

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"most important moments of his life for good or for "evil; the critical points which have made him what "he is, either as he used or neglected them." (Vol. ii. p. 218.) I said I could have wished for something stronger than this; but, indeed, as coming from Mr. Jowett, it seems to me relatively stronger than even the witness which is borne by the Pauline warmth—the reasoning all on fire—of a Maurice. ("Prophets and Kings," pp. 33, 34.)

The strange assertion of men's utter and consistent unbelief is thus sufficiently contradicted. The other assertion, linked with it, of the general purity and high-mindedness of those who have never once experienced the love of God, may be left to its fate. Few men would like to be told, or feel it a compliment, that in other matters they were of unexceptionable goodness, but in things pertaining to God were blind and stupid hypocrites.

VI. I have already drawn some illustrations from the Essay on the Law; but under the distinct head of *the Gospel in relation to the Law*, it seems to me possible to contrast once more the depth of St. Paul's doctrine with the uncertainties of his Commentator. The Epistles to the Romans and Galatians must have been a trying subject to one who sees nothing consistent in St. Paul's notion of Law. Let me ask particular attention, in justice to Mr. Jowett, to the following conclusions at which he arrives:—"Of what has been said, the sum is as follows:— "When St. Paul speaks of 'the law as the strength of "'sin,' he uses the term law partly for law in general, but "more especially for the burden of the Jewish law on "the conscience; when he speaks of sin, he means "chiefly the consciousness of sin, of which it may be

" truly said, 'Where there is no law, there is no trans-
" 'gression,' and sin is not imputed where there is no
" 'law.' Thirdly, he speaks of the law from his own
" spiritual experience of 'fears within, and of fightings
" 'without;' and from a knowledge of his own country-
" men, who 'please not God, but are contrary to all
" 'men.' The doctrine of the law is to him what the
" doctrine of original sin is to us; the account of the
" prior state before renewal. Lastly, if there be any-
" thing apparently contradictory or to us unintelligible in
" his manner of speaking of the law, we must attribute
" this to the modes of thought of his age, which blended
" many things that are to us separate. Had St. Paul
" distinguished between the law and conscience, or
" between the law and morality, or between the moral
" and ceremonial portions of the law itself, or between
" the law in its first origin and in the practice of his own
" age, he would, perhaps, have confined the law to a
" good sense, or restricted its use to the books of Moses,
" and not have spoken of it in one verse as 'holy, just,
" 'and good,' and in the next as being the means of
" deceiving and slaying him."

Any one who reads carefully this passage, will have some notion of the confused aspect which St. Paul's writings must present to Mr. Jowett. The first observation I would make is, that the value of "distinguishing" varies according to the correspondence of the distinctions with the real differences of things. St. Paul distinguishes, and "we" distinguish, and our distinctions cross: the appeal from both must be to *facts*. For example, St. Paul distinguishes between *the Law* and *Righteousness by faith*, whereas Mr. Jowett would distinguish between *the Law* and *conscience*: the question

between them is, which is the more available distinction of the two? Just as in a case of this kind: "we" distinguish between genius and usefulness, between poetry and business, and think ourselves logical and analytical; our fathers of the seventeenth century disregarded those distinctions, and had another, between insight and stupidity; and so they made John Milton and Edmund Spenser Secretaries of Government, not in spite of their being men of genius, but because they were men of genius. It is possible to maintain, by an appeal to facts, that the old custom answered better, both for genius and for business, than ours. So, on behalf of St. Paul, I would ask for, and submit to, a rigorous scrutiny into the truth of things.

Mr. Jowett is quite right, I think, in saying that the law was to the Jew, and to St. Paul, in a great measure *ideal*, though I cannot agree with his way of explaining it. "This idealizing tendency of his age we cannot "help tracing in St. Paul himself. As to the Jew "of Alexandria the law became an ideal rule of "truth and right, so to St. Paul, after his conversion, it "became an ideal form of evil. As there were many "Antichrists, so also there were many laws, and none of "them absolutely fallen away from their Divine original. "In one point of view, the fault was all with the law; "in another point of view, it was all with human "nature; the law ideal, and the law actual,—the law as "it came from God, and the law in its consequences to "man, are ever crossing each other. It was the nature "of the law to be good and evil at once; evil, because "it was good; like the pillar of cloud and fire, which was "its image, light by night and darkness by day,—light "and darkness in successive instants." (Vol. ii. p. 428.)

Surely, if we endeavour to seize St. Paul's "idea" of law, we need not impute to him such incoherence. And does not common sense point to a clear and definite "idea" of *Law*, such as may be said to be expressed in "many laws," without contradiction or confusion? Law is, according to ordinary notions, dictation or prescription. 'Thou 'shalt do this; thou shalt refrain from that.' By an easy and honest transition it passes from the act or fact of ordering, to the order itself. It means constantly an order *laid down*, *θέμις*, *lex*. But inasmuch as men never have thought of a law or order (owing to the "personi- "fying tendency?") without connecting it with an author, the "law," in this sense, is not separated from its coming forth; according to the Old Testament language, "He "sendeth forth His commandment upon earth, and His "word runneth very swiftly." I see nothing to impeach in this double use of the word. Supposing that Order implies an Orderer, as men have assumed, the common language seems very reasonable.

I take this to be just as much a modern conception as an ancient one. In the present day, as much as in any former time, men by law mean not only the thing laid down, but the laying of it down. By inference, even from common and careless speech, we might say that the "idea" in Law is the idea of ordering or appointing, —is prescription. And I doubt whether St. Paul, when he is speaking *ideally*, that is, of God and human nature, ever departs from this conception.

Certainly, in the Books of the Law, this conception is strenuously insisted upon. There is an evident desire to bring out the Idea of Law. A new name,—the name of Jehovah, the Absolute Being,—was revealed through Moses as the ground of Law. Hundreds of times the

words occur;—"Thou shalt keep these statutes which "I command thee; I am the Lord thy God." The Jewish Law is not merely the *Jewish* Law; it is the great exemplar and development of Law, in the history and government of our race. God was therein revealed to be what He still truly *is*,—the Commander.

But Mr. Jowett believes, as we all do, that through the ages one increasing purpose runs. God made Himself known to the Patriarchs as the general Father, the all-bountiful Parent. It was another stage of Revelation, when He was declared as the source of Law; but it was not the complete Revelation of God. He was the All-giver, and the Ruler; but the mystery of His Providence and of His Government was to be more fully revealed. He was to be manifested in His Son as the loving and forgiving Father of the spirits of men, giving good gifts to men, and governing them, *because* they are, in a spiritual and ineffable manner, His children, created so in the Eternal Son of His love, and claimed by that Son's appearance. Providence and Law both rest upon Grace, and the deepest was revealed last.

Of this Revelation St. Paul was made a witness. It was his calling and delight to testify that the God of Abraham, of Moses, of David, had sent His Son into the world in the nature of men; that this Son, Jesus Christ, had died and been raised to life again, and exalted to the throne of the universe; and that every child of Adam had a claim in Him to be regarded as a child of God, and a right to speak to God as his Father. Every mode of speech was exhausted by St. Paul, to set forth the reality, the closeness, the tenderness, of the relation, constituted in Christ, between God and men. All human relations and all human sympathies were repre-

sented as imperfectly and weakly shadowing that mystical union of spirit with spirit, of which the living ground was in the Son incarnate. Looking back from this point of view upon the older Revelations of God, St. Paul saw that each had been a stage leading onwards to this, and had more and more plainly implied and pointed to this as coming. God as the Parent, creating the family,—God as the Commander and King, creating the nation,—these were more outward aspects of God, the spiritual Father, creating a fellowship of humanity. The last view was expressed in *the Gospel*, the second in *the Law*.

We shall be putting ourselves in St. Paul's position, if we ask ourselves, assuming those historical stages of Revelation to be genuine, how the second stands related to the last. According to the Apostle's view, the revealing of God as a Giver of Law was a direct preparation for the revealing of Him as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. In other words, "the Law was our "schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ." The earlier aspect of God, as a Parent, was indeed, in one sense, the more directly significant of the final one, or of the Gospel. That is, those who held by the Law, and rejected the adoption, might be profitably reminded of the ancient declarations of a Divine Fatherhood. But the orderly development of the Divine Nature through the history of mankind would have been incomplete without that *αἰών*, during which the government of God by Law was the most conspicuous sign of Him. An increasing purpose was running through the ages,—manifesting itself through events and teachings and all such means as God employs; and he who rightly understood and delighted in the purpose at any given time, was in the state to receive the subsequent issues of it. In

all this I am speaking of *facts*, or of things purporting to be facts, not of notions.

St. Paul, then, let us distinctly remember, claimed to be the true Israelite, *because* he received the Gospel. What right has Mr. Jowett, or any one else, to say that there was any inconsistency in this? "They that were "of the circumcision," we are told, when they heard how St. Peter had been taught the true Pauline Gospel, "glorified God, saying, Then hath God also to the "Gentiles granted repentance unto life." There was no need for them to despise the Law, that is, God manifesting Himself through Commandments, because they had come to know the Gospel, that is, God manifesting Himself as the Father of men in Christ.

But truths may be perverted, and a bad use made of good things. A Jew might say to himself, 'The Al-'mighty God has separated my nation to be a peculiar 'people. He has shown His special favours to us by 'giving us a vast body of ordinances, and a sign of sepa-'ration from other people. This is very gratifying to 'think of. We are the Almighty's favourites; we are 'better than the nations whom He rejects and despises. 'He gives His angels charge over us to keep us. Of 'course, we are bound in return to observe those ordi-'nances. It will be a creditable thing to observe them 'with the most scrupulous accuracy; and no doubt it 'will be the means of procuring us additional favours. 'Nay, is it not possible to do even more than God has 'appointed? How good it will be, for example, to give 'tithes, not only of certain kinds of property, but of all 'that I possess! I shall thus be on the right side with 'my Patron.' This, I suppose, was the Pharisee's mode of thought. Does it require much psychological dis-

cernment to distinguish between the truth and the evil of such reasoning? Would Oxford logic forbid one to say that the law was just and good, but that to such a man it was mischievous? Did our Lord dishonour the Law, or vindicate it, when He trampled on the Pharisaical notions of the Law?

After our Lord had risen and the Spirit had come down, many besides Galilean peasants believed on Him. From the rulers and Pharisees, as well as from the cursed people who knew not the law, came daily accessions to the Church. Even "a great company of the priests "were obedient unto the faith." And before long it appeared that some of the Pharisaic spirit had come in with them. There were those who accepted Jesus as the Christ, and even allowed the admission of the Gentiles, but who clung to their pride of caste; and would have every Gentile acknowledge the superiority of the Israelite by submitting to what they had learnt to consider as the sign of that superiority. The Gentiles might believe in Christ, but they must become circumcised and obedient to the Law. Here again, looking at the case from our own point of view, and considering it dispassionately, does it seem to us unreasonable that one who believed in the real Gospel should contend vehemently against such requirements? It is plain enough that under the cold shade of such notions, the Gospel would wither, and the *Law* be worshipped instead of *God*. For this was what had actually come to pass. The Law had been separated from the Lawgiver. It was no longer a sign that the power and order of the world were from God in Heaven, but an excuse for self-assertion and pride. Whereas a true Israelite kept the Law in his heart, because it expressed the will of Him

who had brought his fathers out of bondage and made a nation of them; the false Israelite made a show of keeping the Law outwardly, because he was proud of it and trusted in it. St. Paul, as usual, went to the root of the matter. 'If you do not see,' he said, 'that the 'revelation of God in Christ, of righteousness by faith and 'of adoption, involves and subordinates Lawgiving, in 'precisely the same way that the relation of a father to 'his children includes (or excludes) that of a master to 'his servants, you understand neither the Law nor the 'Gospel. You talk about the Law, but have you ever 'thought what *Law* is? If you deliberately exclude the 'thought of God as a Father, which is what you are 'doing, what is the Law?—A list of rules and ordinances 'telling you what you must do under penalties. Well 'we know what that is to the spirit of a man. We know 'how perversely the natural heart of us all is apt to turn 'all Duty into that cold tyrannous necessity, and then to 'rebel against it. If you will have the Law as a system 'of ordinances, you ought to know how cramping, 'benumbing, crushing, such a power is to the human 'spirit; how it provokes to despair and rebellion. It is 'good, indeed, to be crushed and made hopeless by this 'power, if deliverance from it be given and embraced; 'but not to remain crushed or kicking against it. To 'have been made conscious of Duty apart from God, and 'to have been a miserable hater of it, and then, with 'unutterable softening of the heart, to see a Gracious 'Father *bestowing* righteousness upon His children as a 'blessing, is an emancipation, a passing from death unto 'life. What evil enchantment can it be which seduces 'one who has been made aware of freedom and life, to 'prefer chains and death?'

It is with some reluctance that I have presumed thus to paraphrase St. Paul, but it seemed to be the only way open, without going into such an examination of his writings as it does not belong to my purpose to institute. I have been induced to injure St. Paul by using abstract terms, because Mr. Jowett says, that as soon as you begin to translate his language into modern forms, you find out his confusions. If I have been fortunate enough to convey any distinct impression of Law to the mind of any reader, I would entreat him to scrutinize what St. Paul himself has written, and to see whether the Apostle does not express truths which are of infinite importance to modern times in language differing from that which we use chiefly by being more living and distinct.

Mr. Jowett's excellent plan of seeking for influences acting upon ourselves, which correspond to the Law as it is in St. Paul's Epistles, is not very successful, partly because the Law is not a distinct thing to his mind, and partly because he holds such disastrous opinions upon the subject of society. But his remarks are valuable, and seem to me to show that he had a clearer notion of Law than he has given us in the rest of his Essay. He sees something corresponding to the Law as the strength of sin, in the tyrannical conventions of society; in the thought of self and the remembrance of our past life; in speculative embarrassments about belief; in obstinate habits of mind or body. May we not see one common idea in all these, at least so far as they are truly analogous to Law, viz. a voice 'Do this,' 'Thou shalt not do that,'—with which we are not brought into true harmony? Whatever seeks to constrain our action, without confessedly deriving its authortiy from

a Righteous and Loving Source, is Law to us. In other words, so long as our spirits are in bondage, and not awakened to the freedom of sons of God, we are under Law, and not under Grace. If we must name some crushing influences, the traditions of philosophical and religious schools, amongst which logic and modes of thought appear to have fatal power, laws of political economy and the like, the routine of government, exercise the killing effect of ordinances amongst us. But the state under Law will always be best understood as the simple negative of the freedom of the spirit under Grace.

There is no need to say much about *sin;* it is so thoroughly defined by the Law and the Gospel. Under the Law, it is the transgression of the Law; under the Gospel, it is rejecting the Adoption. And these are only different aspects of it, the one root of it being in self-will.

Nor can any one who understands the relation between the Law and the Gospel be misled by Mr. Jowett's too easy admissions of the difference between St. Paul and the Twelve. When St. Paul speaks, in Gal. ii. 7, of the gospel of the uncircumcision being committed to him, and the gospel of the circumcision to Peter, Mr. Jowett chooses to assume that two different Gospels are meant; whereas St. Paul evidently means nothing else than that the task of preaching the same Gospel to different classes was committed to different persons. To affirm, as Mr. Jowett does, that St. Paul was *conscious* that his Gospel was not good to preach to Jews but only to Gentiles, is to fly in the face of every Letter of St. Paul, and also of the Acts of the Apostles. Here, as elsewhere, Mr. Jowett creates a contradiction, and then charges it on St. Paul. I can imagine any one attempting to prove that St. Paul's

doctrine was different from that of the Twelve, but to say that there would be an inconsistency in supposing that he himself would have preached his doctrine in Palestine, is to contradict too many of his express assertions, and to deny too much of his practice. Mr. Jowett does not mean that St. Paul was honourably careful not "to build upon another man's foundation;" he means that when St. Paul and the Twelve gave one another the right hand of fellowship, it was an "agreement to differ" on the question of Jew and Gentile, although they of the circumcision rejoiced in the admission of the Gentiles, and St. Paul's motto was invariably, "To the Jew first "and also to the Gentile." No other evidence of the "separation" of St. Paul and the Twelve is produced, except the strifes of their converts, so emphatically condemned by the Apostles, and those disputes among themselves of which the result was a full and clear admission of the common truth.

VII. One of the points by which Mr. Jowett is most distinguished from ordinary English commentators, is his endeavour to explain the position which the writers of *the New Testament* took up with regard to *the Old*. This question is discussed in the Essays on the Contrasts of Prophecy, on Quotations, and on the Old Testament.

The use that is made of the Old Testament Scriptures by the writers of the New, has always been felt as a difficulty. Hardly any one would deny that passages quoted from the Old Testament are sometimes applied by St. Paul in senses which could not have been present to the minds of the writers of them. The truth seems to be that St. Paul had no thought of quoting the Old

Testament, as we do, in order to *prove* any doctrine. He did not naturally think of the Gospel as requiring any arguments or any authority to prove it. To him the Gospel was the revealed mystery, carrying light and life with it; and he would have felt it more reasonable to support other things by the Gospel, than to seek for any demonstration, except that of truth and power, in support of the Gospel. But he was thoroughly persuaded that the grace of the Gospel underlay the whole Dispensation of the Law, and he therefore felt that every incident and utterance either of God or man under the Law more or less directly implied the presence and kingdom of Christ. He, therefore, freely uses the sacred words which occur to him; sometimes only for the sake of expressing what he wishes to say, sometimes with a sort of appeal to them, but always really appealing to the truth implied in the words, rather than to the literal words themselves. Mr. Jowett need not assert that St. Paul did not know the difference between an illustration and an argument; it would be more correct to say that St. Paul felt that every "argument" was only an illustration, the substantial evidence of the truth being in the truth itself and in that only. If St. Paul had *rested* his assertions on the arguments he brings or appears to bring, there might be reason to complain of him; but if we can see that he never does rest his message on supports of that kind, we shall be able to estimate, without misgivings, the force of his illustrations. "His very inaccuracy about the letter," as Mr. Jowett says, "arises partly from his feeling for the spirit."

At the same time we ought to give a fair examination to such quotations as appear inaccurate, and not conclude too hastily that St. Paul is playing with words.

Mr. Jowett does not shrink from saying, with reference to the eighty-seven quotations said to occur in St. Paul's writings, "In no passage in the Epistles of St. Paul is "there any certain evidence that the first connexion "was present to the Apostle's mind." In a note on Romans xii. 1, Mr. Jowett maintains that the early Christians used the language of the Old Testament accidentally, as it were; because "some tongue of men "or angels must be the medium of communion between "heaven and earth." According to him, it was the language, and not the matter, that was appropriated. "The words rather than the ceremonies of the law, were "the links which connected the Old and New Testa-"ment; and the more entirely the minds of men "became possessed with the new truth, the slenderer "was the thread of association by which they were "enabled to connect them." "There is no reason to "think that Simeon and Anna, or any of those who were "waiting for the consolation of Israel, saw in the ritual "of the Temple-worship anything which led their minds "to the knowledge of the truth. The spirit of prophecy "rather contrasts with the law than seeks to pierce "through its symbols to a higher light." These are broad statements; but they are *halved* in the following passage: "It seems strange that the Apostle should use "the law to establish the law, and at the same time "condemn the law by itself. What made him apply "one text to the Law, 'The man that doeth these things "'shall live in them,' and another to the Gospel, 'The "'word is very nigh unto thee, even in thy mouth and "'in thy heart?' No answer can be given to this "question. To separate the Old Testament into two "parts, to throw away one half, and make the other

" the means of conveying the Gospel to the minds of his " hearers, to bring forth from his treasury things new " and old, and to harmonize all in one spirit, is a part " of his appointed mission." (Vol. i. p. 362.) As Mr. Jowett elsewhere uses these same quotations as an example of contradiction, I may as well say that he does not find the question so unanswerable in his notes. It is not going much beyond Mr. Jowett's explanations if we say that St. Paul is maintaining, that in the books of the Law themselves there is a testimony to the righteousness by faith; for although the Law, as Law, speaks imperatively, 'Do this,' yet Moses bears witness that the Law itself could not be fulfilled, without remembering that there is a Word from heaven, actually holding converse with the human spirit. In other words, as I have maintained, the Gospel was the light and life of the Law.

An example of the halving method, as applied to the Old Testament, may be found in the Essay on the Contrasts of Prophecy, where Mr. Jowett is embarrassed again by his old difficulty, the corporate conception of the Jewish people. " In the earlier books of the " Old Testament, the whole nation is bound up together " for good or for evil." This appears to Mr. Jowett very staggering. " In the later prophets the darkness " begins to be dispelled, and the ways of God justified " to men." " It is observable that in the Book of " Ezekiel, as well as of Jeremiah, this new principle [of " individual responsibility] on which God deals with " mankind, is recognised as a contradiction to the rule " by which He had formerly dealt with them." Yet Mr. Jowett is too candid not to unsay this speedily. So on the next page he says, " And yet this opposition was

" not necessarily *conscious to* (sic) the prophet himself. " . . . Ezekiel, the first thought and spirit of whose pro- " phecies might be described in modern language as the " responsibility of man, like Micaiah, in the Book of " Kings, seemed to see the false prophets inspired by " Jehovah Himself to their own destruction. As in the " Prophet, so in the Apostle, there was no sense that the " two lessons were in any degree inconsistent with each " other." I will only ask as before, *Are* they inconsistent,—not according to modern modes of thought, but in essential fact and verity?

But we shall see Mr. Jowett working completely round, through the "half," to the "whole" on the other side: "To the contemporaries of the Apostle, the Old " Testament was not half, but the whole, needing nothing " to be added to it or to counteract it, but containing " everything in itself. . . . They brought to the under- " standing of it, not a knowledge of the volume of the " New Testament, but the mind of Christ." (Vol. ii. p. 143.) On coming to these last words, we receive one of those shocks of surprise which cannot fail to await any reader of Mr. Jowett's book. I have striven in vain to find any escape from the plain meaning of the words. If Mr. Jowett had only intended to say,—as elsewhere he says, that the early Christians brought to the Old Testament a meaning which was not in it,—so here, that being full of Christ, they put Him there, He being not in the book already, it would be a taking in vain of those solemn words, of which men far less reverent than Mr. Jowett would be ashamed to be guilty. And I do not in the least believe that Mr. Jowett would deny that assertion concerning the Scriptures, "They are they which testify " of Me."

Unfortunately, Mr. Jowett will not accept the Epistle to the Hebrews as a development of Pauline Theology. Having said once, "A consciousness of the continuous-" ness of the work of Providence, in the old and new "Dispensations, is characteristic of all St. Paul's writ-" ings," (vol. ii. p. 38,) he appears to contradict this, when he says, "It is the opposition, and not the identi-" fication, of the Law and the Gospel, which is the "leading thought of his mind. But in the Epistle to "the Hebrews they are fused in one." (Vol. ii. p. 476.) It cannot be of any great consequence to decide who is the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, but it is of immense consequence to know whether this Epistle is antagonistic to St. Paul's. Mr. Jowett, at the time when he wrote the Essay on the Atonement, was under the influence of the impression that the Old Testament dispensation was contrary to the New, and that St. Paul thought so too, and accordingly, he labours to counteract the opinions which the Epistle to the Hebrews has propagated. The central doctrine of that Epistle is the doctrine of *Sacrifice*. Mr. Jowett's views on this may be considered under a final head.

VIII. In numberless passages Mr. Jowett speaks as if he believed that the old Dispensation came from God,—the same God who is declared in the new,—a Being "of "perfect justice and truth." For the subject of the sacrifices of that Dispensation, and the Sacrifice of which they were the types,—assuredly the most important that can engage the mind of man,—Mr. Jowett has reserved his highest power of self-contradiction.

For no one would dream of denying that the institution of sacrifice is the most central portion of the Old

Testament Dispensation. It is not a mere accident of it, separable from its essence, but is at the very heart of it. And nothing is treated less as an invention of man, nothing more distinctly declared to be an appointment of God. No half view or compromise is here possible. If our Maker chose out the seed of Abraham, and made the Jewish nation an example to all time of His Government, then unquestionably the institution of sacrifice is to be attributed to no other than God Himself. Now concerning sacrifices, Mr. Jowett comes, with a needless reluctance, to this conclusion first,— "that we cannot help admitting a connexion of some "kind between the Heathen and Jewish custom of sacri- "fices." Accordingly they are discussed together, and Mr. Jowett inquires into the meaning of sacrifice. "What did the Heathen mean by sacrifice?" "They "meant (1) that the gods, who were like men, should "feast like men; this is the prevailing character "of the sacrifices in Homer. They meant (2) in the "East something unintelligible to us, but closely "connected with the deification of animal life; from "the blood of the animal a power seemed to flow forth "upon the earth, which, by a sort of magic, communi- "cated itself to the offerer. They meant (3) to supply "a want, and in later times, to perform an ancient rite, "which still subsisted, though the meaning of it had "long passed away; if, indeed, it could have been said "to express anything except the vague and undefined "awe of the first sons of men towards the mysterious "beings by whom they were surrounded. They meant "(4) the abolition of ceremonial pollution, the purifica- "tion of guilt like that of the Alcmæonidæ in a panic- "stricken nation. They meant to do an act, which

"varied with the character of the people or the state of "religion, cheerful or sad, of obligation or free-will; "differing in Greece and the East, and to the Greek in "the age of Pericles and in that of Homer, which might "be nothing more than Fetichism, which might com- "prehend also the devotion of the Decii. They meant, "however, nothing which throws any light on the "mystery of the death of Christ." (Vol. ii. p. 479.)

I wish I could persuade Mr. Jowett's readers to go over this passage, especially from (3) downwards, repeatedly, and with the utmost attention. Being one of the most important passages of an author who glories in the precision of the modes of thought of his time, it ought to be a very model of analytical distinctness. But in the first place, it is not a clear piece of psychology; there is a confusion of subject and object. Mr. Jowett should have analysed the "want" and the "act" which he leaves indefinite; instead of such an analysis, he gives us some opinions held by the Heathen which may have influenced their meaning. Nor is this merely a pedantical objection, like some of Mr. Jowett's to St. Paul. The result of the method employed is that just what we want to know is slurred over. The question is, Was sacrifice the expression of anything deep-seated in human nature? or, from another point of view, Was there anything *true* in sacrifice? Mr. Jowett treats these questions with a certain contempt, and yet obscurely and confusedly gives an answer in the affirmative. "They meant "to supply a want,—" we are expecting to be told *what* want; but Mr. Jowett turns short off, and proceeds to inform us, that in later times men went on doing, from the force of habit, I suppose, an act which had ceased to have a meaning, if it ever had any. Well, but had it

any? Mr. Jowett hints, at last, with a certain disdain, that the motive of sacrifice may have been "the vague "and undefined awe of the first sons of men towards the "mysterious beings by whom they were surrounded." Surely, but for Mr. Jowett's antipathy to ancient religions, he would have found something worth looking into, in this "awe." Such a feeling as he describes was not likely to be an insignificant transitory emotion. Then at last we are told, as if independently of the analysis, by way of a *mantissa* not worthy of the dignity of a numeral heading, that those who sacrificed were doing an act of most pregnant and varied significance, involving the roots of "obligation or free-will," comprehending acts of devotion from that of the Decii downwards. Were the "later times," when there was no meaning in sacrifice, so much later than the times of Pericles and the Decii? or was the devotion of the Decii a hollow piece of ritualism, done by force of habit? But Mr. Jowett can scarcely bring himself to discuss the meaning of anything so offensive to a cultivated mind: of one thing he is quite certain, that sacrifice throws no light whatever on the mystery of the death of Christ.

But stay! in another moment Mr. Jowett tells us that "Heathen and Jewish sacrifices are the dim, vague, rude, "(may we not say?) almost barbarous expression of that "want in human nature which has received satisfac-"tion in Him only." Can anything be more perplexing to an unhappy reader, sincerely desirous of understanding his author? The only explanation of the difficulty appears to be, that to Mr. Jowett the dimness and rudeness of the expression is everything, the thing expressed nothing. Yet, when he goes on to say, "Men are afraid of something; they wish to give

"away something; they feel themselves bound by "something; the fear is done away, the gift offered, "the obligation fulfilled in Christ,"—he seems to be really entering into the mystery of sacrifice, and to feel that the sacrifices of men do throw some light upon the offering of Christ.

Why has Mr. Jowett refused to consider the simple, obvious meaning of the word Sacrifice,—an offering to an invisible Being,—and to ask what is implied in it? Why not assume, at least for the purposes of inquiry, that the Old Testament sacrifice was the norm, from which Heathen sacrifices were deflections? Why not pay the Epistle to the Hebrews at least the respect of considering its theory, before casting it aside in contempt? —That Epistle professes to explain sacrifice,—to give the "idea" of it, which is identical with a fact,—and by so doing to throw light on the Offering of Christ whilst it justifies the sacrifices of the Law. The writer of the Epistle approaches by orderly stages to the great subject, and by the time he comes to the 10th chapter, is ready to teach what sacrifice is. He employs the Old Testament language to do so, and quotes a passage in which it is testified that in the mere outward phenomena of sacrifice God could have no pleasure,—that the only thing pleasing to Him must be "doing His will," gladly becoming God's slave, giving up to Him the spirit of a man in the body of a man. He declares that this was what the Son of God did. He put aside the traditional forms of sacrifice, and revealed its essence. Jesus Christ offered up His body to the Will of God once, and by that act we are sanctified.

Mr. Jowett says that this was not sacrifice, "but the "greatest moral act ever done in this world." Why was

it so great a moral act? what is it that constitutes morality, if we are to measure morality, as I gladly find Mr. Jowett consenting to do, by the "absolute self-"renunciation,—the pure love,—the entire resignation, "—continued through life and ending in death," of Jesus Christ? If morality is not the offering of oneself to God, I know not why the Life and Death of Christ should be regarded as setting forth its essence. To any moral philosophy which does not ground Duty upon our relation to God and His claim over our wills, the history of Jesus Christ must be a perplexing problem. An Atheist is forced to admit that an enlightened regard to one's own interest is more reasonable than self-renunciation; and a Theist who does not hold that all morality is rooted in sacrifice, cannot have a firm theological ground for his morality.

Mr. Jowett, while he does not deny the Atonement, but asserts it, inasmuch as he undoubtingly believes that God has reconciled us to Himself in Christ, is yet conscious of a want of insight into the meaning of it, and finds the Scriptural language concerning it for the most part confusing and misleading, because he does not recognise the fact, that the reconciliation depends on sacrifice. There can be no doubt, I think, that St. Paul, as well as the other sacred writers, exhibits the sacrifice of Christ as the ground of the Atonement; but Mr. Jowett stumbles at the name, and at the outward act, of sacrifice, and therefore finds the sacrificial idea of the Atonement repugnant to his conscience. He sees in sacrifice a disagreeable piece of butchery, done with a foolish notion that the God to whom it is offered likes butchery as a matter of taste, and will make some return for it to his worshippers. Spiritual religion there-

fore, and sacrifice, he considers to be antagonistic the one to the other; and he naturally shrinks from identifying the work of Christ and the redemption of man with anything so revolting to the taste, and the reason, and the heart, as he conceives sacrifice to be. Agreeably to his own view, he holds that when some of the Old Testament writers learnt to oppose mercy to sacrifice, or the moral to the ceremonial law, it was the greatest step onward towards the spiritual dispensation. But what would he make of the following passage in a writer thus enlightened? "Thou desirest no sacrifice, else would I "give it thee: but thou delightest not in burnt-offerings. "The sacrifice of God is a troubled spirit: a broken and "contrite heart, O God, shalt thou not despise. O be "favourable and gracious unto Sion; build Thou the "walls of Jerusalem. *Then shalt Thou be pleased* with "the sacrifice of righteousness, with the burnt-offerings "and oblations: then shall they offer young bullocks upon "thine altar." (Psa. li. 16—19.) Does Mr. Jowett see in the last words merely a pardonable incoherence? or will he allow that they prove that the rites of sacrifice were not repugnant to the feelings of one with whom "spiritual religion" was the important matter?

The theory of Sacrifice and of the Atonement can only be understood clearly by the light of the antecedent mystery, the revelation of which was made by St. Paul, and the other preachers of Christ, the ground of the Gospel. The primordial creation of mankind in Christ underlies and explains our redemption by Him. Sacrifice is the communion of the creature made in the image of God with his Maker. It has an outward expression, amongst other reasons, chiefly because a man is not an isolated being, but one of a connected race, and an out-

ward act is necessary to testify of that which is common to many. The outward forms of sacrifice are various, but its leading type is the offering of the life of an animal. This was especially the offering of those who had flocks and herds, but it was not limited to them, and is fairly regarded as the most normal form of sacrifice in general. When we recollect how the Jewish sacrifices were ordered by Divine legislation, we are led to see that of two parts contained in an act of offering, the most essential was God's acceptance of it, which was assured to those who brought it rightly; the secondary part being the confession of the worshipper, to whom certain feelings were prescribed by the nature of his offering. It appears, from the evidence of Jewish hymns, that the feeling recognised as appropriate to a sacrifice, without which the blood of bulls and of goats could not be thought of as acceptable to the Eternal Spirit, was that of a thankful and contrite heart, or specially, of one whose will was given up into conformity with the Divine Will, in the consciousness of the Divine mercy and righteousness.

Now it was more or less distinctly understood by the Jews, in proportion to their sense of the reality of their fellowship with God, and of their national unity, that such fellowship and such unity implied a Mediator between them and the Absolute God. No one, I suppose, denies that the Jews in all ages were more or less persuaded that there was One, not clearly manifested to them, who was the uniting bond of the nation to God, and of each to his fellows. The idea of a Mediator is not, as is well known, peculiar to the teaching of our Lord and His Apostles, but was philosophically taught and applied by Philo Judæus, from whose school some of the New Testament phraseology is thought by many

to have been adopted. If, then, a Jew believed, as Philo did, that every officer and every act of his commonwealth was an image of the Mediating Word, he was likely to think that sacrifice, which was the most conspicuous and most sacred of his national ordinances, had its living ground in this Invisible Person, as much as any other ordinance. And if so, the real acceptance on God's part must be linked with real sacrifice on the part of the Mediator.

This is the view of the Epistle to the Hebrews. According to the author of that Epistle, the sacrifice of Christ is an Atonement or Reconciliation in virtue of the original relation between Christ and the Jewish race. The earlier chapters speak of Christ, very much as Philo and the Alexandrian school in their best moments had spoken, as having been the King and Priest and Pattern Man, before he was manifested in the flesh. The Incarnation of such a person,—the Eternal Son of God,—His being tried, like as we are, yet without sin, and therefore bearing all our sins, His victory over Evil and the Evil Spirit, His yielding to death and triumphing over it, His absolute doing of the Father's will, His offering of Himself without spot to God,—are the atonement and redemption of men, because He is what He is, and because men are related to Him as by God's creation they are related to Him. And this is the view, expanded to a universal human scope, which is to be found in all the Pauline Epistles. Whenever St. Paul is setting forth broadly the message of Atonement through the Cross, he states as the ground of it the mystery of our creation or constitution in Christ. And because Christ, who is our Head and Archetype, manifested Himself through Sacrifice, therefore all human duty is seen

to be Sacrifice, and Sacrifice to be the one duty of men.

And as the Reconciliation depends upon a certain view of Christ and of the nature of man,—that, namely, which is asserted in the first chapter of Genesis,—so its power to do away sin depends on the same view. Not only is God's righteousness manifested in Christ because Christ was perfectly sinless, but it is demonstrated in Him that God made man to be on terms of submissive love towards Himself. Of those terms sin is the guilty rupture; but inasmuch as man can do nothing, by the very nature of the case, to make amends for it, God reveals His own Purpose, His own Love and Grace as living and persistent, striving with disobedience, and victorious over it. In Christ we see our Election; we can throw ourselves on the promises and covenant of our Father. By the crucified Saviour we are, as it were, dragged back with Himself into the presence and peace of God. The forgiveness of our sins, we may justly say, is binding on the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. He would not be consistent with His own creative design if he refused to pardon and save us. "I am Thine, O save "me," is our reasonable cry.

Mr. Jowett may say that these are not "modern "modes of thought," and therefore are to be rejected as rhetorical and confused. If he means that no one at the present day intelligently holds them, I maintain that among the many earnest Christians who hold and have held them as their greatest treasure, are some of the clearest thinkers that have ever lived. Still more confidently can I maintain that those Christians whose faith and zeal have done great things, have simply acted out those views. They might be fully illustrated, for

example, out of "Wesley's Hymns." In all ages of the Christian Church, Sacrifice, or Surrender, has been discerned to be both the method and the fruit of Reconciliation.

Mr. Jowett writes too often as if he knew nothing but newspaper theology and newspaper philosophy. He might fairly put down to our account the modern wisdom to be found in these organs of public opinion; but he need not assume that the Sophists have all literature to themselves. But if Mr. Jowett means that the views above stated are very imperfectly received, and in conduct very flatly denied by most of the people of this time; while I admit that he has too much right to say so, I make bold to say that the views are nevertheless distinct and true, and that modern habits of thought are in the wrong. What is there sacrosanct in current modes of thought which should forbid us to deny their authority? Modern modes of thought prove themselves in many departments to be too blind and feeble to claim much reverence in the most important of all. We shall judge St. Paul and the Bible, I hope, by an appeal to *fact* and not to opinion. Whoever is a disciple of Plato, and whoever is a disciple of Bacon, should contentedly accept this issue.

And amongst the facts to which I should most unhesitatingly appeal, in support of the Pauline Gospel, is the confusion to which the Thought of the age is reduced through ignorance and rejection of it. Of this confusion Mr. Jowett's book is far too favourable a specimen. There is more of good mixed up with his vacillation, than there is to redeem the chaotic inconsistency of public opinion in general. But if to Mr. Jowett's inco-

herence there be added, instead of his honesty and candour, a desire to produce effect, and unscrupulous recklessness, we have an image of what the journalistic writers who are the reflex of common opinion, are in the habit of exhibiting. It is true that vivacious assertion and expert handling of sentences persuade most readers to accept the cant which is set before them as if there were some sense in it, especially as they are seldom required to think or believe anything but what they were just about believing and thinking before. But any careful reader, who thirsts after order and light, will be only too ready to echo this complaint. Confusion, we are truly reminded by Mr. Jowett, comes out of rhetoric and the conventional phrases of a school. Was there ever a time when conventional phrases were so hackneyed in the pages of religious and philosophical writers? Liberal thinkers may complain, and justly enough, of the slavery to party traditions and of the got-up rhetoric of religious writers and of the pulpit; but is there anywhere to be found a more shameless rhetorical slip-slop than in the windy generalities of a popular "positivist" or "spiritualist?" In reading popular philosophy, whether on Religion, Psychology, or Art, we feel as if we were sent adrift on a sea of personified abstractions, till we lose all notion what a power is, or a will, or a necessity, or a law, and fact is undistinguishably swamped in fiction. This is hardly an age of which the current uses of thought can claim to be accepted as imperative by any reasonable man.

Concurrent with our intellectual disorder is our want of hope. Indeed this age, so far as its thinking men are concerned, seems to have made up its mind to do without hope, and to be saved by "reflection" instead.

Being so sagacious in analysis, and knowing so exactly how everything comes to pass, so that no man could be anything but what he is, and nothing anything but what we perceive it to be, it is inclined to look on instead of looking forwards, and to explain instead of devising. The world incites us all to offer "philosophies" of some portion or other of God's universe. It would be better, perhaps, to leave off philosophising for a time, and if we find nothing better to do, at least to refrain and keep silence till the fire kindles. For mere philosophies have nothing very inspiriting in them, nor does one see clearly what other good they are likely to do. If idol-breaking is wanted, let us have it by all means; but Mr. Jowett, for one, does not write like an iconoclast, nor is any one likely to discern dead idols clearly, or to assault them with vigour, who does not feel it to be his first vocation to preach a living God. There is a mournful strain in one of Mr. Jowett's notes:—"Joy and glorying "seem to belong to that circle of Christian graces, of "which hope is the centre, which have almost vanished "in the phraseology of modern times" (vol. ii. p. 334); and often one fancies that one can catch an undertone of conscious despondency beneath the strange calmness of the entire book. There is reason for melancholy, surely, if we are forced to the conclusion that the early Christians were enabled to rejoice in their afflictions because they were ignorant and excited, but that hope and joy are denied to us because we are enlightened. Either loudly or silently, in such a case, we *must* repine at the Nemesis of Faith. But if we can discover that we are not so very enlightened as we dreamt we were,—if we begin to suspect that St. Paul may have reasoned to as good purpose as we can, and *knew* in Whom he had believed,

then, perhaps, with the belief of the Apostle, his joy and gladness may come back to us, and hope may resume a place in the phraseology of our time.

And with such faith and hope would come strength. Without reverence there is no strength; and what wonder is it that in social life and politics we are so feeble, when we have cast away that ground of manly and persevering action which belief and reverence discover? Mr. Jowett tells us that we all believe that there is no sacred bond between man and man, nothing divine in society; and he draws the fair conclusion that we should leave society alone, and each man retire into himself. When great deeds were done, men believed that the order of society and government proceeded directly from the living God Himself, and that all evil (sin being the root of all evil) was an outrage against the Maker, and an injury to His work. They were equally humbled and exalted by this belief, and were enabled to do great things because they knew that the greatest they could do was less than their duty, but yet would be received as an acceptable offering by God Himself. Now, the fellowship of men is profane to us, and politics a dirty strife by which men may secure prizes. In the philosophy of the day every office of government is a prize thrown open to competition; not a burden, which a man may be called upon to bear. No wonder, I say again, that men govern badly when government is so desecrated. Even good men, admired for their spirituality, have no higher notion of common life than that it may be consecrated by an infusion of religion into it,—as if it were not awful and sacred in itself, and did not claim the reverence due to the living order of God, but might be patronised, and worked

upon, and in various ways improved. And so we get our feeble philanthropies and self-complacent religions, wanting to do a great deal of "good," and glorying in sallies among "the masses,"—not the stern and reverent indignation against wrong, and belief in right, and the sensitive political feeling, which characterised other times. But against all our feebleness, and its root of selfishness, the Bible we profess to receive was testifying; and in the Bible, who more earnestly than St. Paul? and therefore we were to have, as a deserved reward of our unbelief, one of the most admired of our academical teachers writing a laborious work to prove that we need not mind what St. Paul says, and that we are all right, and that human fellowship is sustained by the two pillars, good and evil, and is not in the least Divine, as men once ignorantly fancied.

It is a comforting thought, however,—and with this I will wind up my expostulation,—that, by God's blessing, many may be induced through Mr. Jowett's book, and even, I gladly acknowledge, aided by him, to study St. Paul himself more closely, until they discover in him what his commentator has been unable to give them; and so may learn to recognise once more in the great preacher of Christ and of the body of Christ, an ambassador from its true Lord and Life to a distracted world.

NOTE ON TWO PASSAGES FROM THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS, RELATING TO THE LAW.

I HAVE already implied that I do not agree with those of Professor Jowett's critics who think him seriously at fault in his interpretation of the *language* of St. Paul. My quarrel is with his theology and metaphysics, not with his philology. He makes occasional slips, however, which are to be put down, not to bad principles of interpretation, but to that carelessness of which we have noticed some instances in his own English. One of these slips occurs in a very important passage, of which I am anxious to give what appears to me the true meaning, because of its bearing on the great Pauline subject of the Law.

Galatians ii. 15—20. These words follow the account of St. Paul's denunciation of St. Peter's weakness and want of faith in sanctioning Judaistic exclusiveness. He says to St. Peter: 'If you, a Jew, place yourself on 'Gentile ground, why do you compel the Gentiles to 'take the Jewish ground?' This thought he expands in the 15th and 16th verses. Mr. Jowett says the passage which follows is "extremely obscure." This is an apology for the manifestly unsatisfactory sense which he gives to it, and which I need not repeat, as the interpretation is entirely vitiated by the mistake of rendering εἰ εὑρέθημεν (if we *were* found), as if it were ἦν εὑρεθῶμεν (if we *be* found). I think the Apostle's language may be seen to be quite exact and coherent, if we take the following as his line of thought:—'The very

'fact of our becoming believers in Christ implied the re-
'nunciation of any peculiar Jewish righteousness. We
'confessed we were sinners, and accepted forgiveness in
'Christ, and desired to be clothed with his righteous-
'ness. We, therefore, expressly disclaimed any preten-
'sions to righteousness by the law, and put ourselves
'upon the same footing with Gentile sinners. It may
'be said, I know, that in thus renouncing all righteous-
'ness of our own, in the name of Christ, and boldly
'professing ourselves to be sinners, we are making Christ
'a minister and promoter of sin. But this objection
'arises from a misapprehension of what Christ is, and
'of our relation to Him. In renouncing our own right-
'eousness, we did not renounce *righteousness*, and make
'an alliance with *sin*: we claimed union with Christ
'the Righteous, in whom sin is utterly and effectually
'condemned. If then, having condemned sin, I tolerate
'it—if I build up what I pulled down,—I am self-
'convicted. My dying to the law was not that I might
'live to sin, but that I might live to God, this being the
'very purport of my union with Christ. The grace of
'God in Christ lays claim to the whole man; and in
'confessing this, we are most effectually *honouring* Christ,
'whose death and resurrection are otherwise made
'meaningless.'

This interpretation seems to me quite consistent with every word of the passage, and with the tenor of St. Paul's thoughts. He is holding up Christ as justifying sinners, against the Law as pretending to justify the righteous. He insists, in pursuance of his argument with St. Peter and the Judaizers, that men are justified in Christ *as sinners*, and yet that in this way the Divine Righteousness, which the Law was supposed to magnify, is most truly honoured; inasmuch as the righteousness of Christ is

made effectual in rendering sinners righteous. Belief in Christ alike renounces the Law, and condemns Sin.

In the next chapter, Mr. Jowett again imputes great obscurity to St. Paul, and again, I think, makes a very ineffectual attempt to throw light on the dark place. The relation of the Law to the Gospel receives here, also, most important illustration.

Galatians iii. 14—26. The governing thought of this chapter is that of Inheritance. The race of men, represented by the Jewish people, are spoken of as God's children, in a state of nonage, with an inheritance secured to them by the Father's will as soon as they come of age. The Law is a provision for the government of the race during nonage; and, like the tutelage of children under age, it *testifies to an undeveloped filial relation.*

It should be understood, that the idea of the Mediator, the λόγος μεσίτης, was already familiar to speculative Jews, as we learn from Philo. The educated Jew of that age saw a Mediator implied in the unity of the Jewish race and in every ordinance of the Law, and regarded Him as the ground of the promise, as distinctly as St. Paul did; the peculiarity of the Christian Jew was, that he identified this Mediator with the crucified Jesus. When, therefore, St. Paul speaks of the presence of Christ in the events of Jewish history, he is not announcing a view of his own, but assuming what was acknowledged by all his readers.

I could not do justice by an abridgment to Mr. Jowett's interpretation of this passage; I will only remind his readers that he himself confesses it to be unsatisfactory, in which they will readily agree with him. If we start from St. Paul's own point of view, we find him

occupied with a general argument to this effect: 'You 'Judaizers are magnifying the exclusive Jewish ground, 'of which circumcision is the sign, and the law the 'glory, as something superior to the general human 'ground, of which baptism is the sign, and free grace 'the glory. In doing so, you prove yourselves to be 'un-Jewish; you are denying the true ground on which 'we Jews stand. For we do not date from the Law; 'our privileges are based upon the call of Abraham 'and the promise, as you must yourselves admit. If 'then you look into the nature of Abraham's relation to 'God, and of the promise made to Abraham, you will 'see that by your present notions you are discrediting 'and denying that on which all Jewish privileges rest. 'Abraham's own standing, as the chosen of God, was 'upon the righteousness not of law, but of faith; the 'promise was distinctly a promise of blessing to all 'nations, and not one only, in Abraham; there was an 'express testimony to a spiritual unity in the fact of one 'line only being chosen, and that carefully distinguished 'from a line of mere fleshly descent. Any one who 'recognises these characteristics of the Abrahamic Cove- 'nant, as no true Jew can help doing, will see that there 'is no fulfilment of that Covenant, unless *all nations* are 'admitted unto a common *fellowship of faith in a Being 'who was the root of the chosen race.* The Covenant *is* 'thus fulfilled in Christ. He was the ground of Jewish 'unity. *Union with God in Him by faith* is that to 'which *all nations* are called. The spirit of Christ 'freely given is the promised possession.

'Now we come to these indisputable conclusions 'without naming the law at all; so that it cannot have 'that fundamental character which you give to it. But 'you may, no doubt, justly call upon me to explain the

'meaning of the law; and I will do so readily; for 'though I do not base my Jewish any more than my 'Christian privileges on the law, yet I confess myself 'bound, as a Jew, to vindicate the law as divine and as 'good. Think of a family of sons, not yet grown up, 'waiting for the freedom of adult age, and for the 'inheritance which is secured to them. While they are 'under age they need strict government, or else they 'will go wrong: they need to be treated as subjects of 'authority. You do not think that a family of boys 'are disclaimed as sons because they are kept strictly 'under orders like servants, yet you would be surprised 'if, when they are grown up, they should cling with 'pride to the tokens of their childish subjection. The 'law held the place in human history which is held by 'tutors and governors in a family history.'

St. Paul's words agree precisely, I think, with this argument. Mr. Jowett rightly illustrates what is said about "the seed," by Gen. xxi. 12. "For in Isaac "shall thy seed be called." And when St. Paul adds, "which is Christ," we have but to remember that the Jews were in the habit of looking to a Mediator, or Messiah, as the head of their race, and the centre of its unity. The law was added because of transgressions; the disorders, and tendency to disorders, which prevailed, required a law to keep them in check. It was administered by angels; inferior beings were employed as God's messengers, going to and fro, carrying His thunder and lightning, His wind and rain, executing His blessings and His curses, doing His bidding. But behind the law was the figure of a Mediator, dimly seen, but actually there, and holding the law in His hand. In this Mediator, the Sonship, not yet developed, subsisted. Mediation, the favourite word among the Jews, implied a

bringing together of two parties. The law might come forth from the mouth of God, but it said nothing directly, as a law, of the union of man with God, or of the hope of an inheritance; whereas a Mediator testifies to the close connexion between God on the one side, and another party united by mediation to God. Therefore the law, although subordinate to the promises, yet, if seen in the hand of a Mediator, is in the strictest harmony with the promises. It is a provisional tutelage until the period of inheritance and of full sonship arrives—a keeping watch and ward over those who were prone to wander and lose themselves.

The government of dictation and constraint was very good in itself for an inferior condition; but if set up as an excuse for pride against the liberty of full-grown sons of God, it was to be treated with scorn as rudimentary, unspiritual, and enslaving; or, in other words, as rudiments of the world under which men were kept in bondage. In fact, the Jewish law, as a preparatory discipline, might be ranked with the discipline under which the Gentile nations were also governed; for they, too, were not without law, but were being guided to Christ; and whether in the case of Jew or of Gentile, that which was introductory to Christ became weak and beggarly, as well as worldly or unspiritual, when substituted for Christ.

If this is St. Paul's meaning, as I venture to think it plainly is, he has told us something consistent, intelligible, and deeply true. We have no need to cast off any sound modes of thought in order to understand him.

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